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Summary Table 
 
 
2009 2010 2011(f) 2012(f) 
     
 OUTPUT     
 (Real Annual Growth %)     
 Private Consumer Expenditure -7.0 -1.2 0  2     
 Public Net Current Expenditure -4.4 -2.2 -2  -4     
 Investment -31.0 -27.9 -10¼  -2     
 Exports -4.1 9.4 7½ 7½ 
 Imports -9.7 6.6 6  6¼ 
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -7.6 -1.0 2  3     
 Gross National Product (GNP) -10.7 -2.1  ½ 2     
 GNP per capita (constant prices) -11.4 -2.3  ¾ 1¾ 
     
 PRICES     
 (Annual Growth %)     
 Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) -1.7 -1.6 1½ 1   
 Consumer Price Index (CPI) -4.5 -1.0 2½ 1½  
 Wage Growth -0.8 -1.7  ¾  ¾  
     
 LABOUR MARKET     
 Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,929 1,848 1,820 1,825 
 Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 259 292 304 295 
 Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 11.8 13.6 14¼ 14 
     
 PUBLIC FINANCE     
 Exchequer Balance (€m) -24.6 -18.7 -18¼ -17 
 General Government Balance (€m) -23.0 -49.9 -15¾ -14     
 General Government Balance (% of GDP) -14.4 -32.5 -10     -8.5                  
         Excluding once off bank bailout monies -11.9 -11.8 -10 -8.5         
 General Government Debt (% of GDP) 65.6 96.5 111 116 
 
 
1 
Summary 
 
The set of forecasts in this Commentary describe an economy in transition. This 
transition is from an economy where growth was led by domestic demand to one 
where export growth by both multinational and local firms will become the 
engine of growth. This transition is underway as domestic firms in the tradable 
goods sector have sought to replace falling domestic demand by sales in overseas 
markets. Output and exports from traditional firms increased in 2010, with 
exports from the food and drink sectors in particular rising by 11 per cent in value 
terms.  This is very similar to the experience of the 1980s, when exports led 
growth, and the reverse of what happened in the 2000s when the strong growth 
in domestic demand led firms to shift their emphasis from exports to the 
domestic market. 
 
While in 2010 the shift to exports was not sufficient to counteract the decline in 
domestic demand following a rise in the personal savings rate and the 2010 
contractionary budget, we expect some very modest growth this year with GNP 
(GDP) rising by about ½ (2) per cent, and strengthening in 2012 to 2 (3) per cent. 
This year the stimulus is coming entirely from the external sector (both service 
and merchandise exports) as domestic demand will fall again, along with 
investment and government current expenditure. We expect household 
expenditure to rise very modestly during the year, following what looks like a 
slight rise in household spending in the first quarter. Households have been 
reducing their indebtedness very sharply since 2008 and some households may 
now be satisfied with their net debt position.  Consequently, we expect a decline 
in the savings rate in 2012.  Domestic demand will be very slightly positive in 
2012, while we expect external demand to grow by 7½ per cent in both 2001 and 
2012. 
 
A feature of the forecast is that the balance of payments on the current account 
is expected to be in surplus both this year and next, amounting to 1.2 per cent 
and 2.8 per cent of GNP respectively.  These surpluses represent net savings by 
society and are a big change in the position since the early 2000s when the 
balance of payments on the current account went into deficit.   
 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is forecast to increase by 2½ per cent this year 
and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) to rise by 1½ per cent.  The 
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pattern will be very uneven during the year as oil prices are rising in the first half 
of the year but could fall back in the second half. Of greater importance may be 
shifting by consumers to lower priced products and outlets as price variations 
across goods and services remain very large. The deflator for total household 
consumption is expected to remain at the 2010 average level in 2011, but to 
increase by about 1 per cent in 2012. 
 
We expect total employment to fall again in 2011, but at a much slower pace 
than in recent years.  Unemployment will be higher on average than in 2010, but 
the extent of it will be moderated by migration.  The extent of the latter will 
become clearer when the first 2011 census results become available.  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there are emerging skill shortages in some of 
the fast growing services exports sector.   
 
The Public Finance position remains challenging.  It is still too early to form a 
definitive view about the likely outcome for this year, but the Budget figures, 
modified to take account of the increased interest costs associated with the 
recent bank restructuring, look achievable. We think that, given the need to 
return to financial markets within a very short period, attempts should be made 
to correct the budget deficit more rapidly than currently envisaged.  In particular 
proposed capital expenditures should be examined more critically now, given the 
increased cost of funds and the lower level of income and output currently 
prevailing. Current expenditure also needs to be examined both to eliminate 
waste and to be consistent with the new lower level of output in the economy. 
The medium-term profile for the budgetary aggregates set out in Ireland – 
Stability Programme Update will lead to a sustainable debt position. 
 
Attempts at EU and ECB level to contain the banking crisis within the countries 
most directly affected do not take account of the spillover effects of the initial 
problem and the solution currently in place.  What is needed is an EU or Eurozone 
solution that does not place the whole of the burden of recapitalising banks onto 
national budgets already stretched by recession.  
 
Finally, the existence of a balance of payments surplus suggests that government 
may be able to raise more of its borrowing needs domestically.  This requires an 
imaginative approach to selling government bonds to households with substantial 
savings and those capable of generating future savings. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2010 (Estimate) 
 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Estimate % 
 €bn €bn Value Price Volume 
      
.Private Consumer Expenditure 84.3  81.4 -3.4 -2.2 -1.2 
.Public Net Current Expenditure 27.7 26.0 -6.2 -4.1 -2.2 
.Gross Fixed Capital Formation 24.7 17.5 -29.5 -2.2 -27.9 
.Exports of Goods and Services (X) 144.8 158.4 9.4 0 9.4 
.Physical Changes in Stocks -2.3 -0.8    
      
.Final Demand 279.3 282.5 1.1 -0.8 2.0 
.less:      
.Imports of Goods and Services (M) 120.4 129.3 7.4 0.8 6.6 
      
.Statistical Discrepancy 0.7 0.7 -  - 
      
.GDP at Market Prices 159.6 153.9 -3.6 -2.6 -1.0 
.less:      
.Net Factor Payments (F) 28.4 29.1 - - - 
      
.GNP at Market Prices 131.2 124.9 -4.9 -2.9 -2.1 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
 2009 2010 Change in 2010  
 Estimate Estimate    
 €bn €bn €bn  %  
      
.Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.2 2.7 0.5 22.7  
.Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 72.7 68.8 -3.9 -5.4  
  Other: 53.9 51.8 -2.1 -3.9  
.Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 1.0 1.0 0.0 -  
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 -  
      
.Net Domestic Product 129.1 123.6 -5.5 -4.3  
.less:      
.Net Factor Payments 28.4 29.1 0.7 -  
      
.National Income 100.7 94.5 -6.2 -6.2  
.Depreciation 14.8 15.0 0.2 -  
      
.GNP at Factor Cost 115.5 109.5 -6.0 -5.2  
.Taxes less Subsidies 15.8 15.4 -0.4 -  
      
.GNP at Market Prices 131.2 124.9 -6.3 -4.9  
 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 2009 2010 Change in 2010  
 Estimate Estimate    
 €m €m €m  
     
.Exports (X) less Imports (M) 24.4 29.1 +4.7  
.Net Factor Payments (F) -28.4 -29.1 -0.7  
.Net Transfers -0.9 -1.1 -0.2  
     
.Balance on Current Account -4.9 -1.1 +3.8  
.as % of GNP -3.7 -0.9 +2.8  
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2011  
 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Estimate Estimate % 
 €bn €bn Value Price Volume 
      
 Private Consumer Expenditure 81.4 81.4 0 0 0 
 Public Net Current Expenditure 26.0 25.5 -2.0 0 -2.0 
 Gross Fixed Capital Formation 17.4 15.7 -10.2 0 -10.3 
 Exports of Goods and Services (X) 158.4 172.0 8.6 1 7.5 
 Physical Changes in Stocks -0.8 0.5 - - - 
      
 Final Demand 282.5 295.1 4.5 0.8 3.6 
 less:      
 Imports of Goods and Services (M) 129.3 137.7 6.5 0.6 6.0 
      
 Statistical Discrepancy 0.7 0.7 - - - 
      
 GDP at Market Prices 153.9 158.1 2.7 0.6 2.0 
 less:      
 Net Factor Payments (F) 29.1 31.8 - - - 
      
 GNP at Market Prices 124.9 126.3 1.2 0.6 0.5 
 
 
 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
 2010 2011 Change in 2011  
 Estimate Forecast    
 €bn €bn €bn %  
      
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.7 3.0 0.3 11.1  
 Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 68.7 68.0 -0.7 -1.0  
  Other: 51.8 55.4 3.6 7.0  
 Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 1.0 1.0 0.0 -  
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 -  
      
 Net Domestic Product 123.5 126.7 3.2 2.6  
 less:      
 Net Factor Payments 29.1 31.8 2.7 -  
      
 National Income 94.4 94.8 0.4 0.5  
 Depreciation 15.0 15.1 0.1 0.5  
      
 GNP at Factor Cost 109.4 109.9 0.5 0.5  
 Taxes less Subsidies 15.4 16.4 0.9 -  
      
 GNP at Market Prices 124.9 126.3 1.5 1.2  
 
 
 
 
 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 2010 2011 Change in 2011  
 Estimate Forecast    
 €m €m €m  
     
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 29.1 34.3 5.2  
Net Factor Payments (F) -29.1 -31.8 -2.7  
Net Transfers -1.2 -1.0 0.2  
     
Balance on Current Account -1.1 1.5 2.6  
as % of GNP -0.9 1.2  2.1  
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2012  
 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 Estimate Estimate % 
 €bn €bn Value Price Volume 
      
 Private Consumer Expenditure 81.4 83.8 2.9 0.9 2.0 
 Public Net Current Expenditure 25.5 24.5 -3.9 0 -3.9 
 Gross Fixed Capital Formation 15.7 15.6 -0.6 1.3 -1.9 
 Exports of Goods and Services (X) 172.0 186.7 8.5 1.0 7.4 
 Physical Changes in Stocks 0.5 0.5 - - - 
      
 Final Demand 295.1 311.1 5.4 1.1 4.3 
 less:      
 Imports of Goods and Services (M) 137.7 147.7 7.2 1.0 6.2 
      
 Statistical Discrepancy 0.7 0.7 - - - 
      
 GDP at Market Prices 158.1 164.1 3.8 0.7 3.0 
 less:      
 Net Factor Payments (F) 31.8 34.4 - - - 
      
 GNP at Market Prices 126.3 129.7 2.7 0.8 1.9 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
 2011 2012 Change in 2012  
 Estimate Forecast    
 €bn €bn €bn %  
      
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3.0 3.1 0.1 3.3  
 Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 68.0 68.7 0.7 1.0  
  Other: 55.4 60.3 4.9 8.8  
 Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 1.0 1.0 - -  
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 - -  
      
 Net Domestic Product 126.7 132.3 5.7 4.5  
 less:      
 Net Factor Payments 31.8 34.4 2.6 -  
      
 National Income 94.8 98.0 3.1 3.3  
 Depreciation 15.1 15.1 0.0 -  
      
 GNP at Factor Cost 109.9 113.0 3.1 2.8  
 Taxes less Subsidies 16.2 16.5 0.3 -  
      
 GNP at Market Prices 126.3 129.7 3.4 2.7  
 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 2011 2012 Change in 2012  
 Estimate Forecast    
 €m €m €m  
     
 Exports (X) less Imports (M) 34.3 39.0 4.7  
 Net Factor Payments (F) -31.8 -34.4 -2.6  
 Net Transfers -1.0 -1.0 0.0  
     
 Balance on Current Account 1.5 3.6 2.1  
 as % of GNP 1.2 2.8 1.6  
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1. Introduction  
 
 
The basic theme of this Commentary is that the Irish economy is in the process of 
transition. This transition is from an economy where domestic demand was the 
engine of growth back to one where export growth, from both multinational and 
indigenous firms, becomes the main driver of the economy.  The growth in 
exports from indigenous firms in 2010 represents a shift in their focus in response 
to weak domestic demand. The situation is comparable to that of the 1980s 
where export demand led the recovery1 and lay at the heart of the performance 
of the economy from the mid 1980s for more than a decade. The external 
environment was more favourable in the 1980s as the UK, which was the main 
market for Irish goods and services, was experiencing a rapid growth phase (the 
“Lawson Boom”), whereas now the main markets are still experiencing some 
effects of the Great Recession.   
 
THE MACRO PICTURE 
Figure 1 shows the path of the economy (GNP) since the middle of the last 
decade. It is apparent that the economy was fairly flat in 2007. This was followed 
by a catastrophic fall in output in 2008 which continued into 2009 and 2010.  The 
decline in output from 2007 to the trough in the first quarter of 2010 was 16.6 
per cent.   
 
While the economy experienced a decline in output for 2010 as a whole, GNP 
increased in each of the final three quarters of 2010.  This resulted in a positive 
carryover into 2011 at 2.4 per cent.  This contrasts with a negative carryover of 
2.4 per cent into 2010 which was associated with a decline in output of 2.1 per 
cent for the year.  Figure 1 also shows average quarterly GNP for each year, which 
allows us to see this positive carryover from 2010 to 2011.2 
 
 
1
 Durkan, Joseph (1992). “Recovery, recession and recovery again: some aspects of Irish economic performance and prospects 1986-
1993.”  University College Dublin, Centre for Economic Research Policy paper PP92/3. 
2
  As has been pointed out by the CSO in recent Quarterly National Accounts releases, the GNP data have been distorted by the activity 
of a subset of firms that have located their headquarters in Ireland, but where there is no real economic activity taking place here.  
This increases inward net factor flows and thus inflates GNP.  This activity became apparent in the second half of 2010.  We have 
made a rough allowance for this in the third and fourth quarters of 2010, which shows that the adjusted figure fell in the third quarter 
but rose again in the fourth. Consequently, the carryover remains positive, although it is reduced to 1.3 per cent. 
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The forecasts in this Commentary are that GNP will grow by about ½ per cent this 
year, with the positive carryover pulled back by the cuts in expenditure and tax 
increases in the December Budget.  For 2012 the growth rate forecast is 2 per 
cent; it is also limited by the fiscal consolidation required by the EU/IMF bailout. 
 
Figure 1: Quarterly GNP and Year Average, Constant Prices (€000’s) 
 
 
The factors that lie behind the fall in output since 2007 have been widely 
discussed. First, there was a collapse in the construction sector following the 
bursting of the property bubble. Second, there was the consequent 
contractionary fiscal policy as government sought to reduce the fiscal deficit and 
to provide funding for bank restructuring. Third, there was the increase in the 
personal savings rate from 5.6 per cent in 2008 to an estimated 13 per cent and 
14 per cent in 2009 and 2010 respectively as people have sought to repair 
damaged balance sheets and guard against negative income shocks. 
 
In this Commentary we discuss the factors that lie behind the gradual turnabout 
in the economy since the first quarter of last year.  This is due to export growth 
outweighing declines in other components of GNP.  Our analysis suggests that 
2010 has seen the return to export growth by indigenous firms, alongside the 
export growth by multinationals which has remained remarkably robust since the 
start of the recession.  While published export data do not distinguish between 
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exports by multinationals and indigenous firms, we can estimate the different 
sources of exports sales by looking in detail at export categories and ownership 
patterns. This involves categorising exports as being modern or traditional and 
identifying whether these categories are dominated by multinational or 
indigenous firms. We do this against a background where output is rising and 
domestic demand is falling.  
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2. Exports of Goods and 
Services 
 
 
The overall volume of exports of goods and services increased by 9.4 per cent in 
2010, following declines in 2008 and 2009, and was 4.2 per cent above the 
previous peak level in 2007.  Merchandise exports increased by 7.7 per cent in 
volume terms.  Table 1 below shows the level of exports of goods in 2009 and 
2010 and the percentage change organised by SITC Section.  The data indicate an 
increase of 6.1 per cent in total merchandise exports in 2010, with considerable 
variation on growth rates across categories.3 
 
Table 1: Merchandise Exports by Category (Value) 
 
SITC   2009 
€m 
2010 
€m 
% change 
 
0 Food and Live Animals 6,270.6 6,973.0  11.2 
1 Beverages and Tobacco 1,079.1 1,186.0    9.9 
2 Crude materials    972.0 1,442.1  48.3 
3 Mineral fuels    594.8 1,027.2  72.7 
4 Animal and vegetable oils      20.0        26.8    34 
5 Chemicals and related products 47,987.7 52,426.0    9.2 
6 Manufactured goods (by Material)   1,243.4   1,443.3  16.1 
7 Machinery and Transport Equipment 13,585.2 10,989.2 -19.1 
8 Miscellaneous 2,464.0 2,711.3  10.0  
9 Other 832.0 677.6 -18.6 
 Total 84,238.9 89,391.8  6.1 
Source: CSO. 
 
Modern sector exports (corresponding to Chemicals, some part of Machinery and 
Transport equipment and Miscellaneous), which are primarily produced by 
multinationals, account for the bulk of merchandise exports, and these exports 
 
3
  The increase in 2010 in merchandise exports took place despite the exit of Dell from manufacturing and exporting computers and 
other products, affecting merchandise exports.  The full year trade data show that Office and Data Processing Equipment exports fell 
from €6.442 billion in 2009 to €4.506 billion in 2010.  The decline in turnover in that sector matches the decline in export values very 
closely, and had the effect of pulling down the overall volume of exports by about 3 per cent in 2010.  In spite of this the volume of 
merchandise exports rose in 2010 by 7.7 per cent. 
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are heavily concentrated in SITC 6 and 7.  We estimate that the value of these 
exports increased by 4 per cent from 2009 to 2010, while all other exports 
increased in value by 12.5 per cent. In effect, the growth rate of non-modern 
exports exceeded that of modern sector exports. These other exports are 
produced in the main by indigenous and traditional firms, concentrated in SITC 
Sections 0-2, 4, and parts of 6, 7 and 8. Table 1 shows these growth rates; for 
example, food exports (the value of live animal exports is very small) increased by 
11.2 per cent, while beverage exports rose by 9.9 per cent and similar increases 
were recorded by other traditional sectors.   
 
Following the approach adopted with exports, we categorise production data 
from the CSO into modern and traditional sectors. These data show that output 
volumes in the modern sector increased by 10.7 per cent in 2010 following an 
increase of 2.6 per cent in 2009, while output in the traditional sector rose by 1.9 
per cent following a fall of 14.1 per cent in 2009. If we exclude the production of 
construction related output then traditional sector output rose by around 3.1 per 
cent.  There were quite divergent patterns in price changes between the modern 
and traditional sectors. In the pharmaceuticals sector for instance there were 
significant price falls while there were significant price increases in the dairy 
sector. 
 
A combination of these two patterns, against a background where domestic 
demand is falling [See Table 4], suggests that traditional sector firms have 
increased output which has gone into export sales. This was facilitated by the 
improvement in competitiveness over the past three years and by an 
improvement in other costs relative to competitor countries. This is the classic 
‘expenditure shifting’ that governments hope for when reducing domestic 
demand to correct a payments deficit or when correcting a budget deficit leads to 
a reduction in domestic demand.   
 
This shifting to export markets by traditional firms is an important positive signal 
of Ireland returning to export led growth. This finding is not surprising as previous 
research (Durkan, 1992) shows similar patterns of behaviour. This is not to say 
that all firms are successfully exporting but rather that sufficient numbers are 
exporting to more than compensate for those firms that have reduced output 
and exports. This finding is also consistent with the findings of Gleeson and 
Ruane4 which show that Irish firms have been able to enter and then re-enter 
 
4
  Gleeson, A.M and Ruane, F., 2007  “Irish Manufacturing Export Dynamics: Evidence of Exporter Heterogeneity in Boom and Slump 
Periods” Review of World Economics, Vol. 143, No. 2, pp.375-388. 
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export markets even at a time when total export sales were contracting.  A key 
issue for policy is to explore how this shift into exporting by Irish firms can be 
strengthened.   
 
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN 2011 AND 2012 
The world economy continues to grow with the developed economies recovering 
well, albeit more slowly than in previous economic recoveries. The UK economy 
also seems set to maintain some growth in spite of the demand deflationary 
impact of budget measures by the new government and the short-term shock to 
that economy due to very adverse weather conditions in the final quarter of 2010 
and the first quarter of 2011.  World output in the first quarter of 2011 has been 
adversely affected by the earthquake in Japan and political changes in North 
Africa.  The latter may be resolved by the second half of this year, while the effect 
of the former is uncertain – clearly the loss of life will affect output, and some 
part of the capital stock is now gone.  The earthquake has also caused some 
disruption to the global supply chain, though it now seems, not as much as 
originally feared. Reconstruction will lead to increased economic activity to 
replace lost capital.  While there are serious international difficulties, the world 
economy is performing reasonably well and is not facing the declines in trade 
experienced in 2008/2009.   
 
The relationship between merchandise trade data and merchandise trade data 
adjusted for balance of payments purposes for Ireland is no longer as clear-cut as 
previously thought. The multinational sector adopts a variety of approaches to 
the recorded relationship between the company operating in Ireland, the parent 
and its subsidiaries and third parties which affect exports and imports of goods, 
exports and imports of services and factor income flows. Ideally, we would like a 
complete analysis of these relationships to separate out the balance of payments 
impact and the domestic value added impact, but the published data do not 
permit this. Merchandise exports adjusted for balance of payments purposes 
were fairly flat during 2010, though running at much higher levels than in 2009.   
 
We expect increases in export volumes for 2011 and 2012. The effect of the Dell 
withdrawal will wash out of the data throughout the year and new firms and the 
expansion of some existing firms will increase capacity. Monthly data are very 
volatile, even when seasonally corrected, but CSO data indicate that exports in 
the first two months of 2011 have increased reasonably well. 
 
12 
The structure of exports from Ireland, with a heavy emphasis on pharmaceuticals, 
reduces the sensitivity of Irish exports to world income changes. In terms of 
supply capacity, in addition to the factors mentioned earlier, the critical issue in 
this sector is the effect of restructuring arising from mergers. This has led to some 
reduction in output and employment, but has resulted in a more efficient set of 
firms. We would expect an increase in modern sector output and exports of some 
5 per cent this year and about the same in 2012.  Output prices for the modern 
sector may continue to decline.  
 
Traditional sector exports are also likely to grow very well. We expect domestic 
firms to continue to increase sales in overseas markets, building on their 
performance in 2010. The key sectors are food, drink and other non-construction 
related manufacturing. Since these exports are still relatively small in relation to 
the markets in which these firms are operating, volume increases of 7.5 per cent 
both this year and next are not unrealistic, given that the supply capacity is 
available. There may be some constraint in milk as the milk quota was reached in 
the 2010/2011 milk quota year, though there could easily be further shifting to 
higher value dairy products. Prices particularly for food and food related products 
are likely to continue to increase perhaps by as much as 4 per cent in both 2011 
and 2012. Overall prices for merchandise exports are not expected to change by 
much though, as noted above, there will be differences between the traditional 
and modern sectors.  
 
Exports of services recovered well in 2010, increasing by 11.5 per cent in volume 
terms on 20095 and running well above the previous peak in 2007, in spite of a 
continued decline in tourism receipts. As noted above, exports of services reflect 
the diversity of arrangements within the multinational sector as well as 
straightforward services. These latter lie behind the growth of the recent past 
and will generate continued growth in the future. Within exports of services, 
computer services account for almost 40 per cent of the total and these increased 
by a sixth in 2010 in nominal terms, while business services account for about 
one-third of the total and increased by about 10 per cent in 2010. The services 
sector has seen new overseas firms being established here and the expansion of 
existing firms so that the capacity is there for further increases in exports.6  In 
addition, Irish service sector firms have turned more to overseas markets given 
the weakness here, much like the manufacturing sector. Thus, exports of services 
could easily see a growth of 9-10 per cent in value and volume in both 2011 and 
2012. 
 
5
 CSO, Quarterly National Accounts, Quarter 4 2010 and year 2010. 
6
  IDA Ireland – Announcement List of Investments in Ireland (April 2011). 
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Tourism receipts are more difficult to anticipate. The number of trips to Ireland in 
2010 was 25 per cent below the peak level reached in 2007 and has declined now 
for three years in a row, with the associated expenditure falling by slightly more. 
The greater part of the decline has been in visits from Britain and this has been 
among those holidaying here rather than visiting friends and relatives. There are 
obvious reasons why Ireland would be a natural destination for British tourists – 
language and proximity, among others. Against this the price level in Ireland and 
poor growth in disposable incomes in Britain have acted to reduce numbers, and 
there may also have been a change in preferences once the “growth miracle” 
collapsed.  As part of the adjustment underway in the economy there has been a 
very large decline in hotel prices and in the costs of eating out, and a reduction in 
the overall price level. Both now seem to have stabilised. Together these have 
improved the cost competitiveness of Ireland vis-à-vis other countries. The critical 
issue for UK visitors is whether their increasing awareness of the change in the 
competitiveness of the tourist sector in Ireland is sufficient to outweigh the other 
negative factors, particularly the uncertainty surrounding the development of the 
UK economy. Awareness is likely to improve given the forthcoming visits of 
President Obama and Queen Elizabeth, though how and when this might 
translate into increased tourism is uncertain.   
 
There was a slight change in the trend in the total number of visitors to Ireland in 
the final quarter of 2010 with an increase in numbers following the declines that 
had been there since 2007. Given these factors, we expect an increase in visitor 
numbers, with expenditure growing by 7¾ in volume terms in both years.   
 
Overall, exports of goods and services are forecast to rise by 7.5 per cent in both 
2011 and in 2012 in volume terms  (see Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2 : Exports of Goods and Services  
 
        
 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012 
           
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
 Merchandise 77 7.2 8.9 84 5¾ 6½ 89 5½ 6½ 95 
 Tourism 4 -10.3 -12.3 3 7¾ 10     3 7¾ 10     4 
 Other Services 63 12.7 11.3 70 10     11     78 9½ 10¾ 86 
           
 Exports of Goods  
   and Services 144 9.4 9.4 157 7½ 8½ 171 7½ 8½ 185 
           
 FISIM Adjustment 1.1   1.2   1.4   1.5 
           
 Adjusted Exports 145 9.4 9.4 158 7½ 8½ 172 7½ 8½ 187 
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3. Investment 
 
 
Total Investment fell by 27.8 per cent in volume terms in 2010.7  In volume terms, 
the building and construction component declined by over 30 per cent while 
machinery and equipment and other elements of investment fell by over 15 per 
cent.  Within the building and construction sector,8 housing fell by 40.3 per cent 
in volume terms, civil engineering works by 21 per cent and the remainder by 
30.6 per cent. There is less detailed information on other investment 
expenditure, but there were declines in expenditure on transport equipment, and 
in other machinery and equipment.    
 
Investment has declined for every quarter since mid-2007 and this is set to 
continue – albeit at a moderated pace – as the overall investment outlook is 
unlikely to improve in the next 2-3 years.  Housing output may decline further, 
both because of the number of unsold houses (new and second-hand) available 
for sale and because of the difficulties of raising finance.  Civil engineering works 
are heavily influenced by the Public Capital Programme, and this has been cut 
back in nominal terms this year and next. The fall in the Public Capital Programme 
between 2010 and 2011 is 27.7 per cent.9 Even allowing for declines in contract 
prices there are clearly some big volume declines implicit in these figures.  Actual 
public expenditure this year may also turn out to be less than budgeted as the 
need for fiscal consolidation may pressurise government to delay or abandon the 
start of any new capital projects.  
 
For new service sector firms or the expansion of existing ones, there is an 
abundance of empty office space, so that additional investment expenditure is 
unlikely to be needed for some time.  As international services increase there is 
likely to be continued take-up of existing empty spaces, but this can run for some 
years yet before additional investment is required.  
 
Investment in the manufacturing sector may improve as expansion of existing 
facilities is undertaken, as new manufacturing firms begin their operations, and 
 
7
  CSO, Quarterly National Accounts Quarter 4 2010 and year 2010. 
8
  CSO, Production in Building and Construction Index Quarter 4 2010. 
9
 Budget 2011. 
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as firms continue process development. Overall investment is expected to fall by 
just over 10 per cent this year and a further 2 per cent in 2012 (see Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 : Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
 
        
 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012 
           
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
 Housing 7.4 -40.3 -43.8 4.0 -15¾ -18½ 3.4 3 5½ 3.6 
           
 Other Building 8.6 -21.0 -23.4 6.5 -20     -22½ 5.1 -15     -17½ 4.2 
           
 Transfer Costs 0.6 -29.0 -37.2 0.4 -12     -15     0.3 0     0     0.3 
           
 Building and   Construction 16.6 -33.1 -36.1 10.9 -17½   -19¼ 8.8 -7 -8¼   8.1 
           
 Machinery and Equipment 8.1 -19 -19¾ 6.5 4     5¾ 6.9 4     8½     7.5 
           
 Total 24.7 -27.8 -29.5 17.4 -10¼ -10¼ 15.7 -2     - ½ 15.6 
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4. Household Consumption 
 
 
Household spending fell by 3.4 per cent in nominal terms in 2010, well down on 
the fall in 2009 of 11.1 per cent.   In volume terms the declines were 7.0 per cent 
in 2009 and 1.2 per cent in 2010, which represented the third year in a row that 
household spending fell in volume terms.  Since the end of 2007 there have been 
declines in spending in nine of the twelve quarters to end-2010, at which point 
the level was back at about end-2005/early 2006 levels. 
 
There are two main sources of data on household spending:  the retail sales 
index, which looks at sales type of business and is available monthly, and the 
household expenditure by types of goods and services which is available on an 
annual basis. The data are not ideal for measuring household consumption as 
expenditure under both these headings includes spending by tourists to Ireland, 
which has fallen in recent years by more than the decline in domestic 
consumption, as indicated above.  Nevertheless, from the retail sales data we can 
see that expenditure has fallen since the peak in 2007 and has declined by vastly 
different amounts by type of retail outlet (see Table 4).   
 
Expenditure on consumer durables has fallen most rapidly, with cars and 
furniture experiencing the biggest declines. The fall in electrical goods 
expenditure is considerably less, but this may be explained by the very large 
decline of 33.3 per cent in prices of electrical goods, while price declines in other 
consumer durables were less.  The fall in bar sales reflects not just the decline in 
real incomes but also includes some longer term factors such as the impact of the 
smoking ban, greater awareness of the risks associated with drinking and driving, 
and a decline in the numbers in the 15-24 age group. 
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Table 4: Retail Sales in 2007 and 2010 (2005=100) 
 
Type of business 2007 2010  % change 
 Motor trades 113.6 63.0 -44.5 
 Furniture and Lighting 123.0 77.4 -37.1 
 Books, Newspapers, Stationery 102.3 72.2 -29.4 
 Hardware, Paints and Glass 116.5 84.9 -27.1 
 Bars 98.9 74.1 -25.1 
 Automotive fuel 107.0 85.1 -20.5 
 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 101.9 89.2 -12.5 
 Electrical goods 136.4 124.8 -8.5 
 Textiles, Clothing and Footwear 120.9 117.6 -2.8 
 Department stores 116.1 113.0 -2.7 
 Pharmaceuticals, medicines and cosmetics 119 117.5 -1.2 
 Other retail sales 122.0 101.6 -16.7 
 All retail business 114.7 93.3 -18.7 
Source: CSO. 
                          
Detailed household expenditure data by type of good are only available up to 
2009.10 These data are much broader in coverage than retail sales but the picture 
by expenditure head is similar. They show that expenditure on public transport 
and communications fell. Housing, which includes imputed rent, private and 
public rents and repairs, increased. Some services, including education, also 
increased in volume terms.   
   
The decline in household expenditure was particularly marked in 2009 and was 
associated with a rise in the savings rate from 5.2 per cent of disposable income 
in 2008 to about 13 per cent in 200911 and about 14 per cent in 2010.  The 
increase in the savings rate has been ascribed to increased uncertainty about 
post-tax incomes and employment maintenance as the necessary fiscal correction 
gets underway.  There could be other factors at work, in particular the need by 
borrowers to reduce the level of their indebtedness to sustainable levels and the 
need by those on tracker mortgages to provide for inevitable increases in 
mortgage interest rates. A rise in the savings rate in these circumstances is not 
unusual.  What is unusual is that it had fallen to 3.6 per cent of disposable income 
in 2007. This 2007 figure is an average across all households. Those who normally 
 
10  
CSO, National Income and Expenditure 2009. 
11  
Note that these are national accounts based estimates.  Estimates based on Institutional Sector Accounts (CSO) are for a savings rate 
of 3.9 per cent in 2008 and 12.3 per cent in 2009.  The 2009 figure from the Institutional Sector Accounts is used to derive the broad 
order of magnitude of the National Accounts based number used here. 
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save may have changed their behaviour very little. Others had borrowed to 
finance expenditure, other than on housing, and as this borrowing ceased, given 
the changed circumstances of the banking system, household spending collapsed.  
 
While there is more clarity now about the scale of public indebtedness and the 
associated fiscal challenges, and the direction of interest rates, the environment 
is not one where any major reduction in planned savings rates, back to mid-2000s 
levels of 6-7 per cent of disposable income, is likely in the short run, though 
actual savings may turn out to be less than planned.  Disposable income this year 
looks set to fall by about 2-3 per cent (see Table 5). Households may maintain 
consumption levels, with some highly income elastic expenditure heads, such as 
holidays abroad, experiencing further declines.  Although car demand is also 
highly income elastic, there are stock issues as cars age and some part of new 
registrations are used to replace older vehicles. The exceptional levels of sales in 
2000, associated with the new millennium, may result in greater replacement as 
vehicles pass the 10 year mark.  Company car sales may also recover.  The 
transformation of the system of annual motor taxation and the Vehicle 
Registration Tax in 2008 from an engine size to a CO2 based system reduced the 
residual value of cars and reduced the level of company car purchases, as 
replacement would have forced loses on firms. 
 
The early indications for 2011 are that the declines in retail sales have levelled off 
in volume terms. This is despite the tax changes and expenditure cuts introduced 
in the December Budget. The tax changes came into effect and were known at 
the start of the year, so that declines in consumer expenditure could have been 
affected immediately. The retail sales index (excluding cars) for the first quarter 
of 2011 is running 0.4 per cent above the fourth quarter level of 2010.  This series 
has exhibited false dawns previously so that more than a few months’ data are 
required to confirm either a levelling off or recovery. Even so the level is still 1.5 
per cent below the average level in 2010 but should increase as the year 
progresses, especially if tourism recovers. While an increase in tourism numbers 
and expenditure does not directly affect domestic household consumption, an 
increase in retail sales will help to stabilise employment levels across the retail 
sector. We expect an increase in non-car retail sales of 1.5 per cent this year and 
about 3 per cent in 2012. 
   
New car sales increased by 14 per cent in the first quarter of 2011 compared to 
the first quarter of 2010, after a somewhat slow start in January.  As noted above 
some of this is by business and hence treated as investment but households are 
also buying new cars.   
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Motor fuel and other household fuel expenditure are likely to fall again in 2011 in 
real terms but power expenditure may stabilise as the price reductions by the ESB 
materialise.  Household expenditure on direct medical and dental services may 
continue to decline because of the fall in incomes.  Practitioners can maintain 
volumes by cutting prices and competition within these sectors could lead to 
price falls.  There has been a very small fall in doctors’ fees, while dentists’ fees 
fell by 4 per cent in the last year.  Neither decline is likely to offset the impact of 
the fall in income on those who must pay themselves for care. Health insurance 
premia have increased very significantly in recent months (by a seventh alone in 
February) and the numbers with health insurance have fallen.   
 
The recent increase in interest rates will have some negative impact on economic 
activity not least because so much has been borrowed by banks from the ECB and 
the Irish Central Bank. The rate increases to date are small so that the overall 
effect will be slight and it may very well be that prudent tracker mortgage holders 
have prepared for this.  Savers will benefit marginally, but then returns for 
savings have been very marginal. The critical issue is whether this is seen as a 
pointer to future increases. The danger is that higher inflation currently 
experienced in the Eurozone becomes embedded in expectations and leads to 
higher wage inflation. With the exception of Germany it is difficult to see this, as 
the higher inflation experienced in many countries reflects a spike in energy 
prices associated with the situation in Libya and in Japan following the 
devastation caused by the earthquake. This is likely to reverse in the short run.  
The situation in Germany is different as the rapid growth in the economy is 
leading to greater pressure in the labour market and this could lead to higher 
wage inflation and greater price inflation in Germany. This is a not unwelcome 
outcome from the point of view of other Eurozone countries given the excess 
competitiveness of the German economy, as evidenced by the continuing balance 
of payments surplus and the fast growth in exports. An increase in German wage 
and price inflation is almost the only mechanism for reducing the balance of 
payments imbalances in the Eurozone. This will be much harder to achieve if 
interest rates depress economies. Nevertheless interest rate increases seem likely 
so that by end 2012 they may be 1 percentage point higher than now. 
 
The picture for household spending this year is that retail expenditure may hold 
up but there will be reductions in expenditure in other components of 
consumption. There is negative carryover from 2010 of about 0.5 per cent into 
2011 so that overall consumption may remain at the 2010 level, but increasing 
very modestly during the year leaving a positive carryover for 2012. If this 
happens, consumption could increase by 2 per cent in volume in 2012. 
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Real disposable income is likely to fall by about 1 per cent next year. We are 
assuming that government will keep broadly to the agreed programme for 
reducing the budget deficit, but that the savings rate will fall, giving an increase in 
household spending of about 2 per cent. While this might seem optimistic the 
critical difference for households is that they now know the parameters of the 
adjustment that the economy faces and can plan accordingly. Furthermore, 
households have been reducing their financial liabilities and increasing their 
financial assets with the net position positive since 2008. Recent data on 
household loans and deposits indicate that this deleveraging by households is 
continuing into 2011. There were very large reductions in bank loans to the 
private sector of some €27 billion from end-September 2010 to end March 2011, 
while deposits fell by €12 billion. At some point the household sector and the 
private corporate sector will decide that the net asset position has reached the 
desired level, and will then reduce additions to the stock of savings and increase 
expenditure. This could happen quite quickly in the household sector, as not all 
households have mortgages and big bank debt. Even with the assumption we 
have made with regard to increased household expenditure, the savings rate will 
be 9 per cent – still well above the rates in the period 1990-1995 before house 
prices began to rise. 
 
The impact of the wealth reduction associated with falling house prices on 
consumption is not clear.  When house prices were rising some clearly borrowed 
on foot of house values to increase consumption. In addition some new mortgage 
lending financed current consumption. Once house prices began to fall and credit 
conditions for new mortgages were tightened then the funds necessary to 
maintain consumption were reduced and consumption was adversely affected.  
The distressed mortgage situation creates additional problems (see Box 1).  
However any effect on consumption may already be in the data in that household 
borrowing has fallen very sharply as households have sought to repair household 
balances to more sustainable levels. 
  
Table 5 : Personal Disposable Income  
 
        
 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012 
           
 €m % €m €m % €m €m % €m €m 
           
 Agriculture, etc. 2.2 22¾ 0.5 2.7 11     0.3 3.0 3¼ 0.1 3.1 
 Non-Agricultural Wages 72.7 -5½ -3.9 68.7 -1     -0.7 68.0 1     0.6 68.6 
 Other Non-Agricultural Income 16.6 2¼ 0.4 16.9 -2¼ -0.4 16.6 9½ 1.6 18.2 
           
 Total Income Received 91.4 -3¼ -3.1 88.3 -1     -0.8 87.5 3 2.5 90.0 
 Current Transfers 27.0 - ¼ -0.1 26.9 -2½ -0.7 26.2 -2½ -0.7 25.5 
           
 Gross Personal Income 118.4 -2¾ -3.2 115.2 -1¼ -1.5 113.7 1½  1.8 115.5 
 Direct Personal Taxes 21.6 -3½ -0.8 20.8 4     0.8 21.6 8¾  1.9 23.5 
           
 Personal Disposable Income  96.8 -2½ -2.4 94.5 -2½ -2.3 92.1  0 -0.1 92.0 
 Consumption 84.3 -3½ -2.9 81.4 0     0.0 81.4 3     2.4 83.8 
 Personal Savings 12.5   13.0   10.7   8.2 
 Savings Ratio 12.9   13.8   11½    9 
 Average Personal Tax Rate 18.2   18.0   19       20     
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BOX 1:  MORTGAGE ARREARS 
by David Duffy 
Statistics on mortgage arrears from the Central Bank shows a steady rise in the 
number and proportion of mortgages in arrears. Of the 786,164 private 
residential mortgage accounts in Ireland, 44,508 or 5.7 per cent were in arrears 
for more than 90 days at the end of December 2010 (Figure 1A). This represents 
an increase of 15,905 from the end of 2009, and continues earlier trend increases 
in the number of mortgages in arrears. In December 2006 it was estimated that 
11,252, mortgage accounts were in arrears for more than 90 days (1.2 per cent).12  
Figure 1A: Mortgage Arrears 
 
 
 
The latest release also includes data showing that 59,229 mortgages have been 
restructured by lenders as part of forbearance measures to assist borrowers 
facing difficulty. A move to an “interest only” mortgage accounts for the largest 
proportion of restructures (38.3 per cent), while reduced payments (paying 
greater and less than interest only) account for 28.3 per cent of restructures.  
Other types of restructuring include term extension (12.2 per cent) and arrears 
capitalisation (11.9 per cent).  A payment moratorium accounts for just 4.3 per 
cent of restructures to date, while other forms of restructuring account for 
another 4.9 per cent. Taking account of an overlap between restructured 
 
12
  Financial Regulator, “Findings of Arrears and Repossessions Handling Procedures Examination”, Press Release, 16 December 2008. 
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mortgages and mortgages in arrears shows that 79,713 mortgage accounts are 
either in arrears greater than 90 days or have been restructured, amounting to 
10.1 per cent of mortgage accounts.  
 
The Central Bank also publishes data on the number of properties repossessed in 
a quarter and the number of properties that have been abandoned or voluntarily 
surrendered by the occupant.  The number of properties being repossessed had 
declined between September 2009 and September 2010 but the most recent 
data show an increase in repossession levels (Figure 1B).  Repossessions 
represent a very difficult outcome for the individual or family involved but it is 
worth noting that with the number of mortgage accounts at over 780,000 the 
number of repossessions represents a very small proportion of outstanding 
mortgages.  The data also show a number of residential mortgage holders in each 
quarter are deciding to abandon their properties or to voluntarily surrender the 
property to the lender, suggesting some borrowers consider their situation to be 
too difficult to resolve. Analysis by the Irish Banking Federation shows that the 
repossession rate in Ireland is low when compared to the UK; for example, there 
were 13 repossessions per 100,000 mortgages here compared to 69 per 100,000 
mortgages in the UK in Quarter 4, 2010.  
Figure 1B: Number of Properties Abandoned or Voluntarily Surrendered 
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Aron and Muellbauer (2010)13 identify the three main economic drivers of arrears 
and repossessions in the UK to be the unemployment rate, the incidence of 
negative equity and mortgage affordability (the ratio of mortgage service cost to 
disposable income). Based on the forecasts in this Commentary, the 
unemployment rate is expected to remain above average at 14 per cent over the 
short term.  Duffy (2010)14 estimates that a high proportion of borrowers are in 
negative equity, numbering approximately 300,000. US research by Foote, 
Gerardi and Willen (2008)15 finds negative equity is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for default.  It is the interaction of housing equity, a 
household’s cash flow16 and house price depreciation or appreciation that 
determines the decision to default. Furthermore, Ghent and Kudlyak, (2010)17 
examine mortgage defaults across US states with both recourse and non-recourse 
borrowing and find that the decision to default where borrowing is on a recourse 
basis is substantially less sensitive to negative equity.   
 
Mortgage affordability in Ireland has shown an improvement in recent years, 
reflecting low official interest rates and house price falls that have been greater 
than cuts in income. However, the ECB recently raised official interest rates and 
the expectation is that further increases are to come. Furthermore, domestic 
mortgage rates have risen independently of official ECB rates, as banks, given the 
cost of funds, raise mortgage rates. Figure 1C shows mortgage affordability over 
the long run (1970-2012), measured by the level of mortgage debt, interest rate 
and personal disposable income. Affordability improved significantly between 
2006 and 2010, reflecting falling house prices and low interest rates. The 
forecasts in this Commentary suggest that a combination of rising interest rates 
and stable house prices may result in deteriorating affordability in 2012. Thus, the 
economic outlook suggests that high levels of arrears will persist from some time. 
 
  
 
13
  Aron, J., and J. Muellbauer, 2010. “Modelling and Forecasting UK Mortgage Arrears and Possessions”, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, Discussion Paper Series No. 7986, September.  
14
  Duffy, D., 2010. Negative Equity in the Irish Housing Market, The Economic and Social Review, Spring, Vol. 41. No.1. 
15
  Foote, C. L., K. Gerardi and P. S. Willen, 2008. “Negative Equity and Fore-closure: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Urban Economics, 
Vol. 64, No. 2, pp.234-245. 
16
  For example, a household’s cashflow can be adversely affected by unemployment, divorce and illness. 
17
  Ghent, A. and M. Kudlyak, 2010, “Recourse and residential mortgage default: Theory and evidence from US states”, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond Working Paper WP09-10R, June. 
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Figure 2C: Mortgage Affordability 
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5. Public Finances 
 
 
While the exchequer framework is not ideal for the purposes of analysis, it has 
been in use for decades and is readily understood particularly now that details of 
the main expenditures by department are available on a monthly basis.  This 
allows analysis of monthly data under main department heads throughout the 
year. 
 
Table 6 sets out the budget figures for 2011, amended slightly by later figures 
with the end year returns, the figures taken from the Revised Estimates of Public 
Expenditure and Ireland – Stability Programme Update, April 2011 (Department 
of Finance) 
Table 6: Exchequer Finances €billion 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Net current expenditure  45.2 47.0 48.9 49.4 
   Net voted expenditure 40.2 40.5 41.7 39.7 
    Non-voted expenditure  5.0  6.5 7.2 9.8 
Current revenue 33.9 34.4 36.9 38.6 
    Tax revenue 33.0 31.8 34.9 37.5 
    Non-tax revenue  0.8 2.7 2.0 1.1 
Current budget deficit (1) 11.4 12.6 12.0 10.8 
Capital expenditure 14.7 8.0 8.2 7.9 
  Net  voted expenditure  6.9 5.9 4.3 4.0 
    Non-voted  7.8 2.1 3.9 3.9 
Capital receipts  1.5 1.8 2.1 1.6 
Capital deficit (2) 13.3 6.2 6.1 6.3 
     
Exchequer deficit (1+2) 24.6 18.7 18.2 17.0 
     
General Government Balance (deficit) 23.0 49.9 15.7 13.9 
Source: Budget 2011, Ireland – Stability Programme Update April 2011 (Department of Finance), rounding may affect figures. 
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The underlying budgetary position is set to improve at a much better rate than 
these figures indicate, as once-off expenditures in relation to Anglo-Irish Bank 
and the Irish Nationwide Building Society are included in the capital expenditure 
in 2010.  The underlying position may also be distorted during the year by the 
cost of the recently announced additional bank restructuring, depending on how 
the capital cost is treated in the accounts.  The estimate for Central Fund Services 
includes the estimated interest cost of the restructuring, but the capital cost is 
not included in the General Government Balance. 
 
The first quarter exchequer returns provide some indication of how the 
budgetary situation is developing.  Voted expenditure is running 2.3 per cent 
below the expected total for the period.  A precise year-on -year comparison with 
2010 is not straightforward as the treatment of the Health Levy has changed.    
The Health Levy is now part of the new Universal Social Charge.  The revenue 
from the Universal Social Charge is included within the heading “income tax”. 
Ideally, this should be separated out so that like-for-like comparisons can be 
made.18 In 2010 the quarterly revenue from the Health Levy was approximately 
€0.5 billion, and if allowance is made for this, underlying voted current 
expenditure rose by just over 1 per cent.    
 
The tax revenue figures provide mixed messages.  Overall they increased by 3.7 
per cent on the first quarter of 2010.   Figure 2 charts the basic data, these data 
seasonally corrected and a trend curve that eliminates random movements from 
the seasonally corrected data. Seasonally corrected19 quarterly tax revenue 
shows a slight upturn, but the trend looks quite flat for the first quarter of the 
year despite the reclassification of the health levy as tax revenue as part of the 
Universal Social Charge.  The data were thus somewhat disappointing. However, 
it is very early in the year and quarterly revenue data are very volatile and there 
could easily be an improvement in the second quarter. The April Exchequer 
Returns point to such an improvement. 
 
 
 
 
 
18
  Previously the Health Levy was accounted for as revenue to the Health Services Executive.  This had the effect of reducing the net 
expenditure, but not, of course, gross expenditure. 
19
  Seasonally corrected using X-11 multiplicative adjustment. 
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Figure 2: Tax Revenue, Seasonally Corrected and Trend Component 
 
 
The budget target, adjusted for the extra interest costs associated with bank 
restructuring, still looks as if it can just about be realised.  On the expenditure 
side there may be some slippage as the Live Register is running above the levels 
assumed at budget time. However, the new programmes for retraining may not 
have kicked in yet, there is also still some work to be done on restructuring the 
welfare code by shifting payments to those in need and reducing emerging 
disincentives to seek work.  In total, transfer payments could be higher than 
budgeted.  While the Budget has allowed for a decline of 2.2 per cent in the pay 
and pensions bill, with a slightly faster fall in numbers at 3.1 per cent, the Revised 
Estimates of Public Expenditure show a fall of 0.2 per cent in the pay and pensions 
bill and a fall of only 1.2 per cent in numbers.  
 
Experience suggests that when funds are tight, non-pay expenditure by 
departments tends to tighten up so that there could be savings already in the 
system but not yet appreciated. It would be important for government 
departments not to spend savings towards the end of the year as is traditional 
under the “use it or lose it” practice, since these savings would ease the 
budgetary situation.  This involves departments taking a very active stance on 
cost-cutting within their own operations, and not just the programmes they 
administer.  In practice, given that government has instituted a review of public 
expenditure, we expect that expenditure cuts will be geared more towards the 
 31 
second half of the year and into 2012.  It is also likely that some capital projects 
will be delayed during this period of adjustment and this would reduce the 
borrowing requirement.  On the revenue side, while the first quarter returns 
were less than we had expected, they could easily improve as the economy 
develops during the year.  Taken together, and given the risks on the revenue 
side, a reduction in capital expenditure could guarantee that the borrowing 
targets are met.  There is a benefit in this over the period of the programme and 
not just in 2011 and 2012.  The figures for 2012 include an adjustment of €3.6 
billion by way of expenditure cuts and tax increases designed to maintain the 
broad pattern necessary under the bailout programme.  The overall figures for 
2012 seem achievable at this stage. 
 
Net current expenditure on goods and services could decline by about 2 per cent 
this year and 4 per cent in 2012.  This is a slightly different time profile to that set 
out in the budget, but occurs mostly because of delays in effecting the necessary 
changes. 
 
The increase in the level of debt in recent years has been very rapid.  The fiscal 
consolidation to date has been very large but the scale of the budget deficits and 
the need to provide funding for the banking system has led to continued 
increases both to the level of debt and the debt/GDP (or debt/GNP) ratio.  The 
Stability Programme Update2011 20 sets out the time profile of the evolution of 
the overall budget deficit and the debt to 2015.  This envisages the ratio of debt 
to GDP peaking at 1.18 in 2013 and then declining.  In order that the debt to GDP 
ratio be stabilised it is necessary to run a primary budget balance (i.e., the budget 
deficit/surplus excluding debt interest payments) equal to the difference 
between the growth in the economy and the interest rate times the previous 
year’s debt/GDP ratio.  To reduce the ratio of debt to GDP the primary balance 
must be greater than this.   The assumptions for GDP growth in nominal terms of 
about 4 per cent in 2014 and 2015, and nominal interest rates of 5.6 per cent, 
together with debt/GDP at 1.18 and a primary budget surplus of 1.7 per cent and 
3.4 per cent of GDP in 2014 and 2015 respectively mean that the condition for 
debt sustainability is satisfied.  This is very important, but can only be realised if 
the fiscal consolidation is pursued.  Furthermore, sustainability is not optimality 
so that we must continue efforts to have pro-growth micro policies, to reduce the 
interest rate, and if possible to have some burden sharing in relation to the level 
of debt at EU level because of the potential spillover effects to other EU countries 
of the banking crisis here. 
 
20
  Ireland – Stability Programme Update April 2011,  Department of Finance. 
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6. Employment and 
Unemployment, Earnings and 
Prices 
 
 
The Quarterly National Household Survey from the CSO is the major source of 
data on trends in employment and unemployment. Total employment continued 
to fall during 2010.  By year end it was 3.4 per cent lower than a year earlier and 
14.7 per cent below the peak level in 2008.  The participation rate has also fallen, 
standing now at 60.7 per cent of the population aged 15 and over, compared 
with 63.5 per cent in the first quarter of 2008. The corresponding figures for 
unemployment in 2008 and 2010 are 14.7 per cent and 4.9 per cent. 
   
There are also big differences between male and female unemployment rates: 
male unemployment now stands at 17.9 per cent while female unemployment 
stands at 10.6 per cent.  The gap of 7.3 percentage points between the two rates 
contrasts significantly from the situation that prevailed in early 2008 when the 
gap was just 1.9 percentage points.  The rise in male unemployment from Q1 
2008 to Q4 2010 at 139.7 thousand is very similar to the fall in male employment 
in the construction sector at 139.3 thousand. These are net figures for 
unemployment changes.  There are large gross flows on and off the Live Register 
so that not all the increase in male unemployment is among those who worked in 
construction.  The fall in female employment, as evidenced from the QNHS, is 
much more dispersed across sectors. 
 
There has also been a continuous decline in the numbers self-employed, both 
sole operators and those who have employees.  There appears to have been 
some migration among skilled workers (electricians, carpenters, plumbers) to the 
faster growing economies of Canada, Australia and to a lesser extent the US and 
Germany following attempts by some countries to recruit skilled workers, and 
well publicised job opportunities in these countries. There may also have been a 
greater incidence of self-employment in construction and the collapse in that 
sector would then have resulted in a fall in the numbers of those self-employed. 
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While employment at an aggregate level has continued to decline, the latest 
QNHS does show some sectors experiencing increases in employment.  There was 
a rise in employment in industry in the final quarter of 2010 from a very low base 
in the third quarter.  There was also an increase in the numbers employed in the 
wholesale and retail trade and in some administrative and support service 
activities. The increases are all small and outweighed by declines in other sectors, 
but these are tentative signs of a change in direction following several years of 
decline across all sectors. The increase in employment in industry is not surprising 
given the rise in industrial output that took place in 2010 and further increases 
are forecast during 2011 and 2012. In the same way some service sector 
employment will increase as services exports rise, though there are emerging 
shortages in some areas.   
 
The Expert Group on Future Skill Needs reported in March that in spite of the 
recession and the level of unemployment there are still vacancies and these have 
increased, with shortages of labour in ICT, engineering, healthcare and finance.  
We expect some very modest increases in wholesale and retail employment over 
the coming years.  Non-market service sector employment is likely to decline – in 
healthcare, education and public administration and defence. There may be some 
increase in private healthcare employment as constraints in the public hospital 
system lead to a shift to private hospital care. Overall, employment may change 
very little from the level at end-2010 implying a fall of about 1 per cent in total.  
Unemployment however will remain high at 14¼ per cent this year and 14 per 
cent in 2012.  Both of these forecasts depend crucially on emigration and may be 
lower if emigration is greater than in 2010. Table 7 sets out our forecasts for 
employment and unemployment. 
 
Table 7: Employment and Unemployment  
 
 Annual Averages 000s 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
  
 Agriculture 96 85 88 90 
 Industry 411 360 345 345 
 Services 1,422 1,403 1,386 1,390 
 Total at Work 1,929 1,848 1,820 1,825 
 Unemployed 259 292 304 295 
  
 Labour Force 2,187 2,140 2,124 2,120 
 Unemployment Rate % 11.8 13.6 14¼ 14     
 Net Migration -7.8 -34.5 -60.0 -40.0 
    of which: Inward Migration 57.3 30.8 15.0 20.0 
 Change in Participation Rate* -1.2 -1      ¼  ½ 
 34 
Average private sector hourly earnings stabilised at end 2009 levels during 2010.  
There are differences in hourly rates across sectors but relative stability is a 
common feature of the recent data.  Given the state of the labour market there is 
unlikely to be pressure for any major upward changes in wage rates at an 
aggregate level, though in areas where shortages exist there could easily be 
increases in basic wage rates. Average earnings for existing workers could also 
rise as firms increase exports if hours worked increase.  We do not expect any 
further declines in hourly rates of pay in the private sector. There may even be 
increases in those areas where skill shortages are emerging.    
Pay and pensions in the public sector are protected by the Croke Park Agreement, 
but government has indicated that there could be further declines in pay if 
productivity gains do not result in significant savings. Given the increase in output 
in industry, unit labour costs have decreased sharply again in 2010 and they 
should fall further in 2011 and 2012.   
   
The outlook for price inflation is more uncertain. As is well recognised there are 
major differences between the different measures of inflation, especially in the 
context of housing cost adjustments. Tracker mortgages may be under-
represented in the CPI as they were less common when the base for the CPI was 
selected. There may also be problems of bias in the methodology used to 
determine the mortgage interest component as set out by Colm McCarthy in a 
previous edition of the Commentary.21 
 
In addition to these concerns it should be noted that the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) are fixed base indices 
and thus take little account of shifting patterns of expenditure. That these 
patterns have changed is amply demonstrated in Table 4 which examined the 
extent to which expenditure by retail outlet has varied during this crisis. The 
implied deflator for household consumption is better at picking up these changes 
and it declined in 2010 by 2.4 per cent while the CPI and the HICP fell by just 1.0 
per cent and 1.6 per cent respectively. 
 
The divergent patterns of the CPI, the HICP and the personal consumption 
deflator are represented below in Figure 3. While we expect the CPI to increase 
by 2½ per cent this year and HICP to rise by 1½ per cent, the household 
consumption deflator may remain unchanged. Furthermore, the quarterly 
 
21
  McCarthy, C. “Owner-Occupied Housing Costs And Bias In The Consumer Price Index”, special article in ESRI Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Autumn 2007. 
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pattern during the year may be very uneven and affect the different measures 
differentially. The increase in interest rates will impact on the CPI but not on the 
HICP.  The increase in fuel prices may be short-lived and could reverse from mid-
year, and the fall in electricity prices for ESB customers will pull down the index. 
However, there are risks of further inflation should fuel and energy-related prices 
prove not to be transitory, and these will have to be monitored closely. 
Figure 3: Year-On-Year % Change in Measures of the Price Level 
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7. Imports and the Balance of 
Payments 
 
 
Imports of Goods and Services increased by 6.6 per cent in volume terms and by 
7.4 per cent in value terms in 2010.  Imports of goods rose by 1.3 per cent in 
volume while imports of services increased by 9.9 per cent.   Much of imports of 
services, with the obvious exception of expenditure abroad by residents, are now 
related to exports, which is why a set of inter-related accounts for the 
multinational sector is important.  As multinational exports increase, royalty 
payments and other services are charged directly to the activity.  Consequently, 
the large increase in exports of goods in 2010 is associated with a corresponding 
increase in imports of services.  The same applies to 2011 and 2012.  Thus, we 
expect imports of goods and services to increase by 6 per cent this year and 
about the same in 2012 both in volume terms.  Within these numbers, 
expenditure abroad by tourists from Ireland is expected to fall in 2011, but to 
increase in 2012 (see Table 9 opposite). 
 
Reflecting the pattern of trade the balance of payments is forecast to go into 
surplus this year at €1.65 billion (1.2 per cent of GNP) increasing to €3.6 billion 
(2.9 per cent of GNP) in 2012. The Balance of Payments are set out below in Table 
8. 
 
Table 8: Balance of Payments 2010-2012, €billion  
 
 2010 2011 2012 
Exports of goods and services 158.4 172.0 186.7 
Imports of goods and services -129.3 -137.7 -147.7 
Net Factor Payments -29.1 -31.8 -34.4 
Net Transfer -1.1 -1.0 -1.0 
Balance on current account -1.1  1.5  3.6 
 
 
 
  
Table 9: Imports of Goods and Services   
 
 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012 
           
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
 Merchandise 45 0.2 4.6 47 3½ 4     49 2½ 4     51 
 Tourism 6 -6.9 -7.3 6 -1     0     6 3     5     6 
 Other Services 69 11.4 10.5 76 8¾ 8½ 83 8½ 9¼ 90 
           
 Imports of Goods  
   and Services 120 6.6 7.4 129 6     6½ 137 6¼ 7¼ 147 
           
 FISIM Adjustment 0.7   0.7   0.8   0.8 
           
 Adjusted Imports 120 6.6 7.4 129 6     6½ 138 6¼ 7¼ 148 
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8. Overall Output 
 
 
GNP is forecast to increase by ½ per cent in real terms this year and close to 2 per 
cent in 2012.  In both years GDP will grow faster, but the data for GDP must be 
treated with caution (see Box 2 below).  The rapid growth in exports by 
multinationals increases the share of multinational profits in output and hence 
widens the gap between GDP and GNP.  Total domestic demand, which gives a 
better flavour of what is happening in the economy, declined in each of the years 
from 2007 on, but the rate of decline dropped from 13.9 per cent in 2009 to 5.6 
per cent in 2010.  In 2011 we expect domestic demand to decline further but at a 
very much lesser rate of ¾ per cent and it is forecast to increase by ¼ per cent in 
2012.  The very big decline in 2009 was not due solely to the deflationary 
measures introduced by government as the increase in the savings rate also acted 
to contract the economy. 
BOX 2: MEASURES OF OUTPUT 
The terms GDP and GNP are used interchangeably to capture the concept of 
overall output.  The concept for a closed economy is very straightforward as all 
output arises within the economy, all income is generated by that output and all 
expenditure accounts for that output.  It is this characteristic of a closed economy 
that gives rise to the equality between income, expenditure and output.  When 
the economy is open this equality is preserved, but when the ownership of the 
factors of production is held abroad some part of the income that is generated in 
an economy does not accrue to its residents.  GDP attempts to measure total 
output produced in an economy but GNP measures that part that accrues to 
residents.  For most economies the difference between GDP and GNP is trivial but 
in the case of Ireland it is very significant.  In 2010 GNP was 81.1 per cent of GDP 
down from 85.1 per cent in 2005.  The counterpart of this is that GDP fell less, by 
5.2 per cent, than GNP, which declined by 9.4 per cent between 2005 and 2010.   
 
There is a perception that GDP refers to multinationals while GNP refers to the 
local economy.  This is not the case.  GDP measures the value of output that is 
produced in the economy, while GNP subtracts the profits of multinationals 
operating out of Ireland from GDP as these profits obviously do not accrue to 
residents.  However, the overseas profits of Irish multinationals must be added in 
as these do accrue to residents, and national debt interest paid abroad is 
subtracted.  The net effect in 2010 was an adjustment of €29 billion to GDP to 
arrive at the GNP estimate.  This net figure is the result of gross flows which are 
very large, with a gross outflow of €85 billion and gross inflow of €56 billion.  
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Most of the focus is on the profits of multinationals and the extent to which these 
are overstated by transfer pricing, influenced by differences in corporate tax rates 
between Ireland and the home country of overseas firms.  In practice, and in 
particular in relation to US companies, the US Internal Revenue Service agrees 
with companies the pricing of within-company transactions.  In many cases there 
are no arms-length prices that can be used for comparison.  The important point 
is that companies are limited in how far they can locate profits in Ireland.   
 
During 2010 the situation was complicated by some UK companies locating their 
world-wide head office here and their paper profits here, in order to avoid the 
threat of the taxation of these profits in the UK.  These companies were not liable 
for any company taxation here because of double tax agreements with other 
countries. However, the transactions had the effect of increasing the size of Irish 
GNP.  The bulk of this took place in the third quarter of 2010 so that both the 
third quarter and fourth quarter data are affected. Consequently, GNP changes 
are not a reliable indicator of what was happening in the second half of 2010.    
Thus both GDP and GNP figures are problematic for these quarters. 
 
GNP is still a more realistic measure of the concept of output than GDP, but there 
are other measures.  Gross National Income (GNI) is measured by adding EU taxes 
less subsidies to GNP, while Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) is GNI plus 
current net transfers from the rest of the world (this includes emigrants’ 
remittances).  GNDI is the broadest and most inclusive measure of income 
available but is rarely used in practice. 
 
GDP is sometimes measured at market prices and sometimes at factor cost, the 
difference being the inclusion of indirect taxes in a market price measure.   
Comparisons between countries are usually in terms of GDP for growth purposes, 
and for income per head differences (though income per head measures are also 
adjusted for relative purchasing power between countries). Within an EU context 
the Maastricht Treaty conditions for fiscal aggregates were expressed in terms of 
GDP (the Debt/GDP ratio at 60 per cent, the budget deficit at 3 per cent), and 
these were carried into the original and revised Stability and Growth Pact.  
Confusingly, countries’ contributions to the EU budget are determined by GNI. 
   
When differences between these aggregates are large and variable between 
countries, comparisons and the determination of the most appropriate measure 
of output/income is not obvious.  There can also be serious differences because 
of the distinction between factor cost and market prices, where a heavy reliance 
on indirect taxes can widen the gap between these, so that differences in GDP 
per head or in debt and budget deficit ratios can be distorted.  The simplest 
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measure and one that eliminates most of these issues is National Income (NI) 
which measures income arising in a country and accruing to residents as well as 
income arising from abroad. 
 
When the issue is debt sustainability it is less clear what the focus should be.  The 
analysis can be carried out in terms of GDP, GNP, GNDI or GNI but the critical 
question to help determine whether the debt is sustainable, is which measure 
captures taxable capacity. There is no consensus on this.  Some have argued that 
in principle all income generated in Ireland is taxable so that GDP is the 
appropriate measure, while others have argued that the taxable capacity of the 
profits of multinationals is low, given that the current corporate tax rate is 12.5 
per cent and the fact that the declared profits themselves may be a function of 
the tax rate, as the tax rate influences the scale of transfer pricing.  The best way 
to consider this problem is to see that output produced in the economy is 
different to income available and it is income that government can tax in a 
realistic manner.  The taxable capacity of GNP is very different to the taxable 
capacity of the one part of net factor income that represents the profits of 
multinationals operating here.  This suggests that GNP is the appropriate 
measure of income to use in sustainability analysis and that one should also be 
aware that there is other tax revenue from the profits of multinationals. 
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9. Banking Crisis and the Real 
Economy 
 
 
While the main focus of attention in relation to the banks has been about the 
costs of restructuring, we are also concerned with the impact the continuing crisis 
has on commercial banks’ ability to lend in the domestic economy.  Before the 
crisis was recognised, the commercial banking sector had become increasingly 
dependent on overseas borrowing through the interbank/wholesale money 
markets and debt issues, to fund their operations in Ireland.  Prior to the creation 
of the Eurozone, commercial banks’ ability to lend was constrained by domestic 
resource growth as there were limits on banks’ ability to borrow abroad on their 
own account.  This changed in 1999 and banks were free to borrow without any 
exchange risk in the Eurozone interbank market. The scale of the overseas 
borrowing and the domestic lending associated with it were very large. With the 
emergence of the financial crisis worldwide and the freezing of the interbank 
markets, potential lenders became concerned about the solvency of borrowers. 
Consequently, banks hoarded cash to meet future interbank borrowings and 
Central Banks effectively provided the liquidity that previously had been provided 
by the interbank market. This transformed interbank lending into lending by 
Central Banks. In addition to the difficulties associated with interbank borrowing, 
domestic banks were also suffering a loss of deposits as institutions, corporates 
and to a lesser extent, the household sector shifted accounts overseas or to other 
banks. Finally, domestic banks had realised losses on National Asset Management 
Agency (NAMA) associated business, with the written down value of the NAMA 
associated assets converted to promissory notes, which were used as collateral in 
ECB borrowing. In Table 10 the balance sheet position of covered commercial 
banking institutions can be seen at end-2010.   
 
Table 10: Balance Sheet, Covered Institutions €billion 31/12/2010 
 
Total Assets 455.6 
Loans to Customers 294.0 
Available for Sale Assets 57.3 
Loans to Central Bank/Cash 11.4 
Interbank Lending 14.3 
Other Assets 78.6 
Total Liabilities and Reserves 455.6 
Customer Deposits 169.4 
Debt Securities 60.5 
Subordinated Debt 9.8 
Interbank Borrowing (mainly ECB and CBI) 167.8 
Other Liabilities 27.1 
Equity and Reserves 20.9 
Source: Central Bank of Ireland. 
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The data show clearly the unbalanced nature of the covered commercial banking 
institutions operations with a loan to deposit ratio of 1.74, with loans additionally 
financed by interbank borrowing.  The figure for this at €167.8 consists primarily 
of borrowing from both the ECB and the Central Bank of Ireland.  The total 
outstanding borrowings from the ECB and the Irish Central Bank have remained 
at these levels, totalling some €170 billion at end-February.   This must be seen as 
emergency borrowing, initially because of the failure of the interbank market but 
more recently because of the inability of the banks to borrow on that market 
because of their perceived inadequate capital.  As a consequence, the covered 
commercial banking institutions operating in the Irish market face a funding crisis 
which makes it difficult for them to engage in normal commercial lending.  There 
is a stock of credit outstanding but new credit was hard to come by though not 
wholly unavailable.  The resource base of banks is constrained and they have 
become more risk averse. This has directly affected business seeking working 
capital and households seeking credit.  As a consequence, many new start-ups 
are affected, the housing market has seized up and households are unable to 
borrow for consumer durable purchases, though alternatives to the domestic 
banking system are emerging, with retail outlets providing credit.  In effect, the 
banking system ceased to function except as a payments mechanism. Household 
consumption expenditure is unlikely to revive in these circumstances.  
 
To break out of this, banks need to be restructured to have adequate resources 
to deal with future debts and to allow the re-emergence of new lending.  In the 
absence of a central government authority in the EU the restructuring must take 
place at national rather than EU level The stress tests have revealed an additional 
funding requirement for the banks of some €24 billion. Government actions will 
provide funding directly, with additional funding coming from raised additional 
capital and sales of non-core business.  While the use of National Pension Reserve 
Fund resources reduces the need for additional borrowing, it is the net debt 
position that matters from a debt sustainability point of view. Nevertheless, the 
funding provided by the EU/IMF loans over the period of the fiscal adjustment 
provides ample time to test the extent to which the additional capital is 
adequate. 
  
From the point of view of the economy, assuming the capital restructuring is 
sufficient, the most important part of the restructuring was the associated 
provisioning of €30 billion over 3 years for credit to the domestic economy.  This 
€30 billion is equivalent to the amount that would normally be repaid by 
borrowers over the three years and it is the government’s  intention that this be 
financed by selling off or winding down €57 billion of assets.  This will permit both 
the provision of credit (€30 billion) and a reduction in the balance sheet of the 
banks (€27 billion).  In itself this €30 billion is not additional credit but is a rollover 
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of credit with the added feature that  it is unlikely to be directed to property 
development at home or abroad, so that the household, small and medium sized 
enterprise, and corporate sectors should get better access to credit.  This credit 
may not be readily available immediately, though in principle it could be.  The 
competition aspects of public ownership of such a large part of the banking 
system must be always considered, as a well functioning competitive banking 
system is necessary to increase the competitiveness of the economy. The 
existence of overseas banks provides some element of competition.  
 
It is clear that the deleveraging of the Irish banks as a policy objective is based on 
a view that domestic deposits are the natural base for domestic lending.  If  Irish 
banks did not have ready access to an interbank market with no foreign exchange 
risk then the property bubble would have been less and the losses of Irish banks 
less, though their market share would have fallen.  Reducing the balance sheets 
of the covered banks effectively means that the scale of ECB and Central Bank 
borrowing must be reduced.  Without a restructuring at EU level this could have 
the effect of resulting in a decade of poor performance for the economy as any 
growth in resources would be used to reduce ECB and CBI loans.  With the 
breathing space created by the IMF/EU funds and the latest bank restructuring, 
government should seek alternative approaches to the banking crisis.    
   
The approach adopted at EU and Eurozone level at present, and now built into 
the “Euro Plus Pact” has been to attempt to contain the banking crisis within 
national borders. However, there are potential spillover effects on other 
economies within the Eurozone if the debt becomes unsustainable in that losses 
would then be incurred by other Eurozone banks and financial institutions on foot 
of their lending to Irish banks. There would also be implications for the ECB, given 
the amount lent to the banking system here. These spillover effects are not just 
banking and other financial institutions effects, as there are trade and migration 
effects as well.  
 
If the debt becomes unsustainable then Irish GNP will fall further and this would 
have knock-on effects for our trading partners – a fact recognised explicitly in the 
UK support for the bailout. The most sensible approach, given the spillover 
effects, would be a restructuring at central Eurozone level.  A central government 
approach is in effect what happened in the US and in the UK with the respective 
Treasuries taking a central role and the Central Banks providing liquidity, but the 
EU and the Eurozone lack the central government authority to do this – a serious 
externality in governance that was not anticipated when the Maastricht Treaty 
was signed and when the ECB began.  This requires an innovative and imaginative 
approach if the constraints at individual country level are to be eased. 
 44 
There are several possible approaches to EU centred restructuring.  The simplest 
would be an interest free loan from the ECB to the Irish Government, guaranteed 
by the Irish Government, sufficient to overcapitalise the banks.  The two aspects, 
i.e. external funding and overcapitalising, would give the exercise credibility, 
would allow the banks to return to the interbank market, to reduce their 
indebtedness to the ECB and the Irish Central Bank and to begin providing 
additional credit to the economy. An alternative would be for the ECB to 
undertake the recapitalisation directly and to convert the funds used for 
recapitalisation into equity with a view to future sale of the assets.  There are 
obvious difficulties with the implementation of either of these as they involve the 
ECB “moving outside the box” laid down in Maastricht.  A third approach 
envisages the European Financial Stability Facility (after June 2013 the European 
Stability Mechanism) issuing bonds and using the funds raised to lend to banks 
who could then repay the ECB and the Central Bank of Ireland with the EFSF 
funding converted to equity.  This approach releases the banks from the 
constraint they face on the interbank market, allowing them back into that 
market.  Once banks can get back to the interbank market they will be able to 
repay the ECB for interbank support.    None of these approaches is without 
difficulty, but then the actions of the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and 
the ECB itself when the financial crisis struck, were also problematic. 
 
Any of the above approaches will allow banks to return to the interbank market. 
Otherwise any potential resource growth will be used to repay the ECB and 
Central Bank of Ireland, business and the household sector will be short of credit 
and this will reduce growth, result in more company failure and further bad debts 
at banks. With credible external restructuring there would be a return to growth 
in the economy and this would ease the extent of the deficit reduction by cuts in 
expenditure and tax increases that otherwise are necessary. This requires that 
there is an acceptance that this is an EU problem and requires EU solutions.  
Whether or not measures such as those outlined above are adopted, serious 
consideration needs to be given to the “Euro Plus Pact” as it has not addressed 
the governance issue and appears to copper-fasten the present approach. 
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10. General Assessment 
 
 
The general picture for Ireland outlined in this Commentary, while still very poor, 
is more favourable than has been the experience of recent years. The 
fundamental difference is the continued strong performance of multinational 
exports together with an increase in exports of goods and services from domestic 
firms.  This latter can be likened to an expenditure shifting process whereby a 
contractionary domestic demand policy by government as part of a fiscal 
consolidation sees firms shifting output to export markets.  In practice, this may 
not happen if firms are not already in overseas markets or if their cost structure is 
out of line with that in other countries, and even if firms can shift it may take 
some time before this happens.  The collapse in output in 2008 was very dramatic 
and sudden but, as indicated earlier in the Commentary, firms in the tradeable 
goods sector seem to have looked to export markets in order to be able to 
survive, and this is now bearing fruit. 
 
The policy issue is the extent to which this shift can be strengthened and the 
transition to an export led growth be speeded up within the constraints imposed 
by fiscal consolidation.  This can best be achieved by reducing the overall cost 
burden on firms.   
 
STRENGTHENING THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION 
There have already been wage and salary adjustments at firm level, but it would 
be important not to increase the cost of labour by tax changes which might 
translate back into wage demands.  This suggests that further tax increases need 
to be broadly based.   
 
Comprehensive property taxes have regularly been recommended in an Irish 
context, but after the experience of local rates, abolished in the 1970s, and the 
later residential property tax, abolished in the 1990s, there is some reluctance to 
proceed with a new property tax. The problems with local rates were associated 
with expenditures over which local authorities had little control, and there were 
serious inequities in the operation of the residential property tax. A 
comprehensive property tax, applying to all property and introduced at a 
relatively low rate with a declared time profile so households could adjust, would 
provide additional funds without many of the disincentive effects associated with 
other taxes. Research by Callan et al. (2010) shows that a property tax can still 
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raise substantial revenue, even when combined with an income exemption limit 
for those with a lower ability to pay.22 
 
The shift in taxation of motor vehicles from an engine size basis to CO2 emissions 
was a move in the right direction, but while intended to be revenue neutral it led 
to static motor tax receipts even though the number of vehicles increased. There 
was very significant shifting to relatively low CO2 emissions vehicles in new cars 
bought since the measure was introduced in the summer of 2008.23 The incentive 
could still be maintained at higher rates of motor vehicle taxes and this could also 
avoid reducing the value of the existing stock of older cars.  In the present 
circumstances facing the economy there is very little benefit in reducing the value 
of assets by administrative changes at a time when households’ real incomes are 
squeezed.   
 
The introduction of water charges for households would provide additional 
sources of revenue perhaps to local authorities or to some central authority 
which assumes the role of providing water. Charging for water would have the 
effect of reducing usage and providing funds to finance much needed investment.  
In addition, it would also permit a rebalancing of local authority revenues and 
permit reductions in local authority rates on business.  This would improve the 
competitive position of firms.  Even where firms are in the non-tradeable sector, 
lower costs will translate into lower prices as long as there is competition and this 
will impact favourably on the costs of firms in the tradeable goods sector.  There 
have also been proposals to limit the number of local authorities in order to 
improve efficiency and to lower costs directly.  These proposals should be actively 
pursued. 
 
Not only will these measures help increase government revenues, they will also 
provide an opportunity to reduce local commercial rates, which are a significant 
burden on firms. Local authorities have increased their charges significantly as 
revenue from levies and contributions associated with housing have fallen, which 
has negatively impacted on the competitiveness of businesses.   
 
 
22
  Callan, T., Keane, C., and Walsh, J. R., 2010 “What Role for Property Taxes in Ireland?” The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 41, No.1, 
Spring, pp. 87-107 
23
 Hennessy, H. and Richard Tol, 2010. “The Impact of Tax Reform on New Car Purchases in Ireland”, ESRI Working Paper No.298. 
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FISCAL CONSOLIDATION 
EU/IMF funding provides a breathing space for a limited number of years.  Then 
the government must go back to financial markets and raise funds, both to 
rollover debt and finance any small level of additional borrowing.  This argues for 
reducing the budget deficit early and ensuring that the outcomes are well within 
the targets set at the various break points. In an era of easier finance a slower 
pace of fiscal adjustment might be desirable, but as recent events have indicated, 
funding is extremely difficult. Thus, there is an absolute need to establish 
credibility in financial markets and this can best be achieved by reducing the 
budget deficit. While this is a change in the position adopted in previous editions 
of the Commentary, it reflects the more difficult funding environment 
internationally. 
 
The fiscal consolidation programme envisages cuts in public expenditure and 
these need to be implemented soon.  The Minister responsible for Public 
Expenditure and Reform has announced a review of public services in order to 
see where rationalisation, among other objectives, can take place.  The process, 
however, is unlikely to be significantly different to that which took place in 2009.  
This involved outside consultants but the bulk of the knowledge and the input 
came from the officers in the Department of Finance responsible for individual 
departments and from the departments themselves.  It is difficult to see how 
another exercise will give very different results, unless the information available 
to the consultants was not sufficiently detailed or accurate.  The question now is 
one of implementation, which will be very challenging to achieve.  Nevertheless, 
we would expect that current expenditure programmes will be critically 
examined with a view to making significant cost savings. 
 
In an idealised world the marginal benefit of €1 across all headings is the same so 
that uniform cuts would suffice as a means to reduce expenditure.  However, we 
are not in an idealised world and consequently there may be considerable 
benefits to be obtained from a detailed analysis of expenditure and selective 
reductions across different budget lines. Cutting across the board as a first pass 
could very soon highlight critical areas where marginal benefits are either small 
or large, but it could be a very risky strategy.  The Croke Park Agreement is seen 
by some as preserving pay for existing public sector workers but there is also an 
expectation that improved practices would lead to greater productivity so that 
services will be maintained with lesser numbers.  There needs to be some 
positive movement on this, setting out in detail the requisite savings.  There may 
also be some possibilities for reform in the welfare code as there may be some 
incentives that limit the willingness of some to get back to work by creating high 
replacement rates while people in serious need have had benefits cut, so that a 
reorganisation of expenditure may be beneficial.   
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As with current expenditure, public capital expenditure needs to be looked at 
much more critically than in the past, particularly now that the cost of funding 
has increased.  One way to achieve the reduction in the level of new borrowings 
is to delay or cancel new projects.  When there appeared to be no public finance 
constraints, many projects were conceived, designed and accepted as if there was 
no cost – the M9 motorway rather than a high-quality dual carriageway and some 
of the proposals for integrated public transport in the Dublin region are the most 
obvious examples.  There is also a need to reconsider the scale of new projects to 
the lower level of income now prevailing, the lower level of population and lower 
growth in the medium to long-term than seemed plausible just a few years ago. 
 
Government should persist with attempts to reduce borrowing costs under the 
EU/IMF deal.  It is difficult to justify the scale of the differences between market 
rates and the rates charged unless some risk of default is built in.  The moral 
hazard argument does not apply as we are already in this situation and it is 
difficult to see why any country would deliberately get into this position, even if 
interest rates were lower.  Nor is it obvious why other governments should be 
seeking a trade-off for lower interest rates with a higher corporate tax rate.  The 
trade-off is already there as the potential spillover effects of the banking collapse 
are contained within Ireland. 
 
Finally, the emergence of a balance of payments surplus has its counterpart in an 
increase in a private sector surplus and a reduction in the public sector deficit.  
Whatever about the precautionary reasons for saving it is clear that the 
household and corporate sectors have been restoring their balance sheets.  At 
some time they will reach levels that participants are happy with and then 
household spending and investment will begin to increase again.  This will be 
copper fastened if the public finances are corrected as otherwise the uncertainty 
about future taxes could keep domestic savings high.  The balance of payments 
surplus indicates that domestic savings are more than sufficient to finance 
government, so that different debt instruments more suitable for domestic savers 
could reduce the need for external funding. A significant amount has been raised 
from State savings Schemes but perhaps more could be done. The shortening of 
the time frame for realising National Solidarity Bonds was a good move, but these 
bonds still need to be sold.  The conditions set for subscribing to the National 
Solidarity Bonds could be more purchaser-friendly. They could be more readily 
available and efforts be made to improve their liquidity without undue penalty. 
This would improve their attractiveness.  The government should also consider 
actively extending the sale of these or similar bonds to overseas Irish and those of 
Irish descent.  
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Equality and Discrimination:  
Lessons from a Research Programme and a 
Conference 
*Frances McGinnity and Helen Russell 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite legislation outlawing discrimination across the EU, inequalities between 
groups appear to be an enduring feature of Irish and European societies. The 
extent to which inequality is due to discrimination is a matter of continuing 
debate and controversy. Accurately measuring discrimination is therefore a 
crucial yet challenging task. This has been a central focus of a research 
programme on equality and discrimination carried out by the Economic and 
Social Research Institute and the Equality Authority since 2006, and was the 
theme of the conference  ‘Making Equality Count’ held in Dublin in June 2010. 
Drawing on economics, sociology and social psychology, the book from the 
conference, Making Equality Count, highlights advances that have been made in 
the measurement of discrimination, as well as the range of evidence that has 
been accumulated on this topic in recent decades.† Here we give a flavour of the 
measurement issues and the salient findings from the book.†† 
 
MEASURING EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION  
Inequality and discrimination can be investigated using a range of different 
methods, each with different strengths and weaknesses. In self-reports of 
discrimination, survey respondents are asked directly about their experience.  
The analysis of self-reports can consider experiences of discrimination across the 
whole population - not just a specific minority group - and can compare self-
reported discrimination across a variety of situations. This method has played an 
important role in tracking change (and stability) in the experience of 
discrimination.  However self-reports are subjective, depending on respondents’ 
perception of their treatment by others.  
 
 
 
*
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A second technique to investigate discrimination compares outcomes (like 
unemployment rates, pay) across groups and statistically adjusts for non-
discriminatory sources of difference like education, skills and experience. 
Remaining differences are commonly attributed to discrimination. While there 
have been important developments in statistical methods over recent years that 
have improved our understanding of inequality,  it remains difficult to assess how 
much of this remaining difference in outcomes is due to discrimination.   
 
The third approach commonly used to measure discrimination is based on 
attitude surveys of the general population. These investigate attitudes and beliefs 
about the “out-group”, and more favourable attitudes towards the majority 
group. While these studies can be informative, especially if well-designed, 
respondents may be reluctant to express attitudes or opinions that are not 
socially desirable, such as being prejudiced. Furthermore discriminatory 
behaviour cannot simply be deduced from attitudes, though these may be 
strongly related. Other techniques have been developed to bypass attitudes and 
measure discriminatory behaviour directly through field experiments.   
 
Field experiments can provide direct evidence of discrimination. Instead of 
measuring attitudes, these studies measure the actual response of employers or 
service providers to carefully matched candidates who differ only in respect to 
the characteristic on which discrimination is thought to occur – gender, race, 
nationality, age etc. These experiments occur in real life situations, for example 
applications are sent in response to actual job vacancies, and the responses are 
observed.  While these studies can provide powerful evidence on discrimination, 
they can only be carried out within certain situations (e.g. applications for 
housing, job applications, accessing services/products, grading) at the initial point 
of contact, and cannot be used to detect discrimination in other processes like 
promotions.  
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS  
Making Equality Count presents selected findings from the Irish research 
programme and adds international perspectives on equality and discrimination.  
 
People’s Experience of Discrimination in Ireland  
In the first paper in the book, Russell and her colleagues present self-reported 
discrimination in Ireland in a range of social contexts including work and 
accessing services, using high-quality survey data from the CSO for 2004 
representing the whole population. The highest reported discrimination was in 
recruitment (just under 6 per cent of those who had been seeking work) and 
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discrimination in the workplace (5 per cent). In services, the highest reported 
discrimination was in accessing accommodation (4 per cent) and financial services 
(almost 4 per cent). The authors note that people with disabilities and non-Irish 
nationals experienced discrimination in a wide variety of contexts. For other 
groups, discrimination was more context-specific. These results provide an 
important benchmark for examining changes in the nature of discrimination 
experience in the future. The survey was repeated in late 2010, and results from 
this will facilitate the monitoring of reported discrimination patterns in Ireland.  
 
What do experiments tell us about discrimination? 
Two papers show how field experiments may overcome some of the difficulties 
with measuring discrimination by comparing outcomes.  Judith Rich presents an 
interesting overview of the field experiment method and what experiments in the 
last 50 years have to tell us about discriminatory behaviour in markets. Rich 
reports that access to jobs was restricted for racial minorities, women, older and 
obese individuals; access to housing was restricted for racial minorities and 
homosexuals, and that racial minorities, women and older individuals paid more 
for products. Rich concludes that it is of concern that the more recent tests (since 
2000) report similar findings to earlier studies (starting in the late 1960s), given 
public concern about discrimination and legislative developments in the area.  
 
In the first experiment of its kind in Ireland, McGinnity and her colleagues tested 
for discrimination in recruitment against minority groups. The researchers sent 
out almost 500 equivalent CVs in response to advertised vacancies for jobs in 
administration, finance and retail sales in the greater Dublin area. They found 
that candidates with Irish names are over twice as likely to be asked to attend an 
interview as are candidates with an African, Asian or German name. The 
discrimination rate was relatively high by international standards, and did not 
vary across occupation. Interestingly they found no difference in the degree of 
discrimination between different minority groups, and argue that this may be 
linked to the recent nature of immigration in Ireland and the lack of established 
minority groups.  
 
Insights from Social Psychology 
The paper by Al Ramiah and colleagues adds insights from social psychology to 
our understanding of discrimination. Social psychologists are careful to 
distinguish prejudice (an attitude) from stereotype (a belief) and discrimination (a 
behaviour). Influential explanations of discrimination discussed include the social 
identity perspective (the drive for positive social identity can result in 
discrimination against the out-group) and aversive racism (a group upholds 
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egalitarian norms while maintaining subtle prejudice). The paper discusses ways 
in which these and other ideas have been tested. Implicit measures of prejudice 
have been developed to capture the prejudice that people are unwilling or are 
unable to express. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is based on the idea that 
people make connections more quickly between pairs of ideas that are already in 
their mind. Yet studies have found that not all individuals who hold negative 
attitudes go on to discriminate. What is clear is that discrimination may have 
serious consequences in terms of mental and physical health, self-esteem and 
underperformance for the minority group. 
 
Race and Discrimination: A US Perspective 
In his paper on racial inequality, William Darity describes the widespread 
perception that the US is a ‘post-racial’ society, and illustrates this cogently for 
the general population using survey data. He argues that this perception also 
permeates much of conventional economics. It does so in two major ways. First, 
the individual is at the centre of economic thinking - not a racial or ethnic group, 
or a social class. Second, conventional economic theory argues that market 
competition drives out discriminatory practice: profits and prejudice are mutually 
exclusive. Darity’s ‘stratification economics’ research programme was developed 
in response to deficiencies identified in conventional approaches to 
discrimination. Evidence from this body of research strongly contradicts the idea 
that the US has become a post-racial society. In fact Darity argues that a post-
racial society is not the ideal, and he calls instead for a ‘race fair’, not a ‘race 
blind’ society.  
 
Evidence on Inequality: Gender and Disability 
The final three papers in this book present empirical evidence on differential 
outcomes across groups, focusing on gender inequality (Gregory); disability 
(Gannon and Nolan) and the combination of gender and disability (Watson and 
Lunn). In her review of research on the gender pay gap, Gregory considers recent 
evidence from OECD countries. Where is the pay gap greatest and what are the 
mechanisms underlying it? Recent research across the EU which looks at pay gaps 
for low, middle and high earners has clearly shown that the difference between 
men and women’s pay is greatest for higher earners, supporting the idea of a 
‘glass ceiling’ on women’s earnings. The family pay penalty is an important 
component of the gender pay gap: research in Germany found a significant wage 
drop following maternity leave; this diminishes with time back in work, although 
a penalty for work experience foregone remains. In Denmark, on the other hand, 
the only effect of children on mother’s earnings was through lost work 
experience. Gregory concludes that in a social climate supportive of working 
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mothers, as in the Scandinavian countries, the pay penalty to maternity leave can 
be minimal.  
 
Gannon and Nolan summarise a number of research studies in Ireland concerned 
with how the experience of people with a long-term disability or illness differs 
from that of other people. The paper considers evidence from a range of areas, 
including education, earnings and poverty. Using econometric models, the 
authors found that, after accounting for age and gender, those with a chronic 
illness or disability that hampered everyday activities were much more likely to 
have low educational qualifications than those with no illness or disability. They 
were much less likely to be in employment and also more likely to be in poverty 
than those with no disability, after accounting for a range of other factors. In 
conclusion, the authors reflect that designing policies to combat this 
disadvantage is also challenging, particularly in the current economic climate. Yet 
the experience in other countries has shown that, given adequate social 
investment and attitudinal changes, the disadvantage associated with disability 
can be greatly reduced.  
 
In policy debates on discrimination and disadvantage, the notion of multiple 
disadvantage has gained considerable appeal, though is rarely tested using data.  
In their paper using 2006 Irish Census data, Watson and Lunn ask: does 
membership of two disadvantaged groups increase the risk of a negative 
outcome? They tested this, examining differences by gender and disability status 
for four outcomes: risk of low education, labour market participation, 
unemployment and being in low-skilled employment. They found that the most 
common pattern was that membership of both groups is associated with less 
disadvantage than the sum of risks associated with membership of each group 
separately. There were also some cases where membership of both groups is 
associated with a level of disadvantage approximately equal to the sum of the 
two risks. Watson and Lunn conclude that it is difficult to generalise about 
multiple disadvantage, as results vary substantially across outcomes. Indeed an 
interesting lesson from their paper is that the notion of multiple disadvantage 
may be simple but its application to real life data is complex, and may result in 
unexpected outcomes.  
 
Conclusion 
Making Equality Count contributes to the literature on equality and 
discrimination in a number of ways. Firstly, it demonstrates the different 
approaches to measurement and highlights their strengths and weaknesses. 
Secondly, it reviews a wide body of research on equality and discrimination, 
including recent evidence on Ireland gathered from the Research Programme on 
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Equality and Discrimination. Thirdly, it demonstrates how important the 
collection of adequate data collection is for the whole project. Fourthly, it draws 
out some policy implications of the findings. Policy on equality and discrimination 
needs to be informed by convincing evidence, and innovative research can 
provide that evidence.  
 
 
 
†Bond, L., McGinnity, F. and Russell, H. (2010) (eds) Making Equality Count: Irish 
and International Research Measuring Equality and Discrimination. Dublin: Liffey 
Press.  
Both the conference and the conference publication were co-funded by the 
Equality Authority and by the European Union Programme for Employment and 
Social Solidarity - PROGRESS (2007-2013). 
 
††All reports published under the research programme on equality and 
discrimination are available at: 
www.esri.ie/research/research_areas/equality/research_programme_on_equ/ 
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Creating a Health Promoting Environment:  
The Role of Food Access 
*Richard Layte 
An analysis of international data on overweight and obesity shows Ireland in a 
very unflattering light. Along with the UK, Finland, Greece and the US, Ireland has 
some of the highest rates of adult and child obesity among developed countries 
and trends suggest that the situation is going to get worse. If so, today’s children 
will probably have higher levels of diabetes and cardiovascular disease and live 
shorter lives than their parents, bringing to a halt three decades or more of 
increases in Irish life expectancy.  
 
What’s causing the rise in obesity? What polices should we adopt in response? 
Evidence suggests that individual diet and not enough physical activity are the 
principal causes of obesity and it could be argued that primary responsibility for 
staying healthy in this regard lies with individuals and families. That is probably 
true, but since human nature is pretty stable over time, it is likely that the 
principal causes of the increase in overweight and obesity in Ireland are to be 
found in our environment and society. If so, current problems may stem from a 
wide range of public policy choices in recent decades that have had unintended 
consequences for health and well-being. For example: 
 
 Investing in roads and cars instead of public transport encourages people to 
drive directly to their destinations rather than walking. Allowing development 
of housing estates without considering the amenities that people will need to 
live healthy, productive lives such as local schools and shops. 
 
 
*
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Some recent ESRI research
† sought to examine whether the environment in 
which people live influences their behaviour and specifically, whether the food 
people eat is influenced by where they live. Previous research in Ireland has 
shown conclusively that individuals and families with less income or from a lower 
social class tend to have less healthy diets. This could be because they have less 
income to buy food or perhaps, because they like eating food with more fat, salt 
and sugar, but poorer people also tend to live in poorer neighbourhoods which 
have fewer food shops, particularly larger supermarkets. Supermarkets stock a 
wider range of fresh food than the more numerous but smaller convenience 
stores, so it is possible that at least part of the worse diet of poorer individuals 
may be due to the greater distance they need to travel to buy healthier food (see 
Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Distance to Nearest Supermarket and Dietary Quality 
 
 
 
 
Layte and colleagues tested this by calculating the distance from each 
respondent’s house to all of the food outlets in the country and deriving 
measures of the distance to the nearest supermarket and the density of 
supermarkets in the local area. They then estimated the impact which increasing 
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distance and number of supermarkets had on the diet of the person in the last 
year controlling for the person’s own and their household’s characteristics 
(income, age, car ownership etc). Their results showed that as the distance to the 
nearest supermarket increased it was accompanied by a small but significant 
decrease in the healthiness of the individual’s diet.   
 
This is the first time such an effect has been found in Ireland but more 
importantly, the first time such an effect has been found outside of the US. There, 
poor food access tends to be associated with the ‘food deserts’ found in some of 
the larger cities with pronounced racial segregation and concentrated social 
deprivation. Low levels of inward migration until comparatively recently mean 
that Ireland has nothing like the racial or ethnic segregation of the US. However, 
there has been a tendency since the 1960s for lower income and local authority 
housing in Ireland to be built in large estates on the periphery of the larger cities, 
with little or no infrastructure, including retail opportunities. The recent building 
boom, particularly in areas around major Irish cities, may have added to this, with 
housing built in formerly rural areas with little regard for the local infrastructure. 
It may be that the increased distances required to buy food and social 
segregation of Irish housing development has had a negative impact on the diets 
of Irish citizens and poorer Irish citizens in particular, and may therefore 
contribute to inequalities in health in Ireland. 
 
 
†
Layte, R., Harrington, J., Sexton, E., Cullinan, J., Perry, I.J. and Lyons, S. (2011). Irish Exceptionalism? 
Local Food Environments and Dietary Quality, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health. 
Available pre-publication online as 10.1136/jech.2010.116749.    
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The Changing Workplace  
*Dorothy Watson, Helen Russell, Philip J.O’Connell  
INTRODUCTION 
How are Irish workplaces changing? Recent reports
† give a detailed picture, 
based on two nationally representative surveys – one  of  employers and another 
of employees – carried out in 2009. These surveys replicate many aspects of the 
first national workplace surveys, carried out in 2003 in the midst of an economic 
boom. The new surveys took place in dramatically changed economic 
circumstances. In the private sector, the economic crisis threatened the very 
survival of many firms. In the public sector, budget cuts and recruitment 
constraints created severe challenges in delivering public services. 
 
The results of the employer and employee surveys are published in two separate 
reports but address a number of common themes, including: 
 
 What is the impact of recession on the workplace and employees? 
 Has the way work is organised changed? Have workplaces adopted ‘high 
performance’ workplace practices (HPWP)? Key aspects of HPWP are the 
devolution of decision making to employees (employee involvement), training 
and skill development in the workplace (human capital development) and 
working co-operatively in new ways. 
 What are the workplace practices and employee characteristics that are 
associated with an openness to innovation and actual innovation in products 
and services? 
 
EMPLOYEE PERSPECTIVE 
The National Workplace Survey of employees was based on a telephone survey of 
5,110 public and private sector employees conducted in 2009.  
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Impact of Recession 
While unemployment and job loss are the most obvious labour market measures 
of recession, the impact can also extend to those who remain in employment. 
Our results show strong evidence of change in organisations and in job 
conditions.  Over half of employees reported that there had been a reduction in 
staff numbers in their workplace in the two years preceding the 2009 survey, with 
public and private sector employees equally affected. Employees were also more 
likely to have experienced organisational restructuring in 2009 than in 2003.  
 
In terms of job conditions, one employee in three felt that their job security had 
decreased (compared to less than 1 in 20 in the 2003 survey). Overall, 30 per cent 
of employees felt that their job was not secure. Feelings of insecurity were more 
common among private sector employees than public sector and, unsurprisingly, 
were highest in construction. One fifth of employees reported a decline in hourly 
pay. Furthermore, over half reported that their work pressure had increased in 
the preceding two years (up from one third in the 2003 survey). 
 
These organisational changes are found to have decreased workers’ job 
satisfaction and their organisational commitment, factors which are linked to 
motivation and productivity. Furthermore, reductions in staff numbers and 
organisation re-structuring were associated with increased work pressure 
(intensity) and work-family conflict. (Many other factors affecting job satisfaction 
are taken into account in this analysis, but the impact of staff cuts and re-
organisation is statistically significant). 
 
Employee Involvement and Consultation 
Employee involvement can take a variety of forms and the survey was designed 
to capture this diversity. Direct participation of employees includes practices such 
as work teams; problem-solving groups; project groups; quality circles; and 
continuous improvement programmes. Overall, 45 per cent of employees 
indicated that such participation practices were present in their workplaces, and 
36 per cent said that they are personally involved in such practices (up by about 
10 percentage points on the 2003 levels in both cases). 
 
Employee engagement can also be more formal and indirect, involving 
partnership institutions – formal committees in which unions work with 
management to promote co-operation and improve organisational performance. 
Just over 1 in 5 of employees indicated that such arrangements existed at their 
workplaces.  
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The extent of active consultation regarding work is another element of employee 
involvement. For instance, almost half of employees indicated that they were 
consulted before decisions were taken that affected their work and over half also 
believed that if they were consulted, attention was paid to their views. This 
pattern of responses had changed little since 2003.  
 
Skills and Learning 
Despite the strong policy focus on skills, the proportion of employees who had 
recently participated in employer-provided training remained virtually unchanged 
between 2003 and 2009, standing at just under 50 per cent. Employees in the 
hotels and restaurant sector, those in small firms, those with low initial 
qualifications and older workers were least likely to have received training. 
Training is widely regarded as prerequisite for devolving more responsibility and 
decision-making to employees. We do indeed find that levels of training were 
higher among employees involved in direct participation and those who were 
actively consulted. As the data is cross-sectional we cannot establish if there is a 
causal relationship, however.  
 
Workplace Innovation 
Employee involvement (as described above) is positively related to the innovation 
climate – the strength of support for innovation and new ways of doing things in 
an organisation. Those who work in organisations characterised by the presence 
of participatory practices show higher scores on the innovation climate scale, and 
those who participate personally in such arrangements score higher still. The 
strength of consultation and the frequency of communication of business 
information were both also positively associated with innovation climate. 
 
Output innovation (i.e. the introduction of new products and services), was 
associated with employee involvement either in the form of direct participation 
or via partnership arrangements. Such innovation was also associated with other 
“high performance work practices” such as incentivised rewards and training. 
 
NATIONAL WORKPLACE SURVEY – EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVE 
The National Workplace Survey of employers was based on a postal and web 
survey of 2,668 private sector and 359 public sector employers also conducted in 
2009.  
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The external challenges faced by both private and public sector employers in 
2009 were dominated by the recession. For instance, almost two-thirds of private 
sector employment was in firms that view their current business position as bad 
and almost half was in firms that expected a further deterioration in the coming 
six months.   The public sector was not immune from pressures resulting from the 
recession: coping with the economic downturn and budget constraints were 
causing intense pressure throughout the public sector while, at the same time, 
making it more difficult to implement changes. 
 
We focused on the employment practices present in the organisations and then 
examined the association between these practices and business outcomes and 
innovation. We distinguished three groups of practices: 
 Human Capital Development (i.e. training, performance review; formal 
dispute-resolution procedures; policy on equality/diversity) 
 Employee Involvement (i.e. information/consultation; direct employee-
involvement in decision-making & problem-solving; employee discretion in 
carrying out work) 
 ‘Co-working’  or new ways of working co-operatively together (i.e. 
experimenting with new ways of working; networking and working across 
divisions; new work practices such as team-working; reducing hierarchy) 
 
Previous research suggests that firms and organisations benefit most from 
adopting complementary bundles of employment practices. We conducted a 
cluster analysis to see how Irish employers combined the above three groups of 
practices and identified five clusters of organisations, as shown in Table 1.  
Adopting all three practices was the norm in the public sector (60 per cent of 
employers), but was much less common in the private sector (28 per cent).   One 
in six private sector firms has a low adoption rate for all three of the employment 
practices. 
 
The third column of Table 1 shows the percentage of firms in each cluster who 
introduced new, or significantly improved, products or services in the previous 
two years. There is a clear association between innovation and employment 
practices: 82 per cent of employers who combine all three practices introduced 
new products or services compared to 45 per cent of employers who had a low 
adoption rate for all three.   
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Table 1:  Adoption of Employment Practices in the Public and Private Sectors and Association with 
Innovation and Business Outcomes 
 
Combination of Employment Practices: Public Sector % 
of Employers 
Private Sector % 
of Firms 
Percent 
Introducing 
New Product or 
Services 
Business Outcome 
(Average) – Private 
Sector Only* 
Low adoption of all three practices 1% 17% 45% 2.5 
Human Capital Development 6% 19% 60% 2.7 
Employee Involvement 4% 15% 58% 2.8 
Human Capital Development and 
Employee Involvement 
 
29% 
 
21% 
 
72% 
 
3.2 
Human Capital Development, Employee 
Involvement & Co-working 
 
60% 
 
28% 
 
82% 
 
3.1 
Total 100% 100% 65% 2.9 
* Business outcomes scale measures profitability, employment growth and volume of business in the last two years and self-assessed 
present business position. The scale ranges from 0 to 10, with high scores indicating favourable outcome.  
 
 
In the fourth column, we examine the association between business outcomes 
and employment practices for private sector firms. The ‘business outcomes’ scale 
is based on self-reported profitability, employment growth, change in volume of 
business and present business position. It ranges from 0 (unfavourable) to 10 
(favourable outcomes). Firms that combined all three practices or who combined 
employee involvement and human capital development tended to have better 
business outcomes (3.1 to 3.2) than firms who adopted none of these 
employment practices (2.5).   
 
These patterns for innovation and business outcomes remain when we control 
for size and sector.  We cannot infer causation from these results – better 
business outcomes and an emphasis on innovation may cause rather than result 
from employment practices – but they do suggest the importance of paying 
attention to how workplace practices are combined. 
 
Overall, the results of the study suggested that, although severely challenged by 
the recession, Irish employers increasingly recognise the importance of 
employment practices – as well as outputs and markets – to the success of the 
organisation. This is more developed in the public sector than in the private 
sector. There is scope for convincing the private sector, particularly small firms, of 
the importance of workplace innovation to the future success of their businesses. 
In the public sector, the strong strategic commitment of public sector managers 
to workplace innovation is an important resource in the process of managing 
change in the provision of public services. To develop further, the structural 
barriers to change – in particular the centralisation of human resources and 
industrial relations, organisational hierarchies and bureaucracy – need to be 
addressed and the commitment to workplace innovation needs to be diffused to 
all levels in public sector organisations. 
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†
The two reports are: 
Watson, D., Galway, J., O’Connell, P.J. and Russell, H. (2010), The Changing 
Workplace: A Survey of Employers' Views and Experiences, Dublin: National 
Centre for Partnership and Performance. Available for download at 
http://www.esri.ie/UserFiles/publications/jacb201045/BKMNEXT169.pdf. 
 
O’Connell, P.J., Russell, H., Watson, D. & Byrne, D. (2010) The Changing 
Workplace: A Survey of Employees’ Views and Experiences, Dublin: National 
Centre for Partnership and Performance. Available for download at 
http://www.esri.ie/UserFiles/publications/jacb201045/BKMNEXT168.pdf 
 
The 2003 and 2009 National Workplace Surveys were funded by the National 
Centre for Partnership and Performance (now NESC). Fieldwork was carried out 
by the ESRI Survey Unit in 2003 and by Amárach Research in 2009. The 2003 
questionnaire was developed with colleagues from the UCD Business School. 
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Support from Grandparents to Families with 
Infants 
Amanda Quail, Aisling Murray, James Williams 
Parent-child interactions are influenced by factors outside the immediate family. 
A recent paper
†
 based on data from the Growing Up in Ireland study (GUI) 
focuses in particular on the support provided by grandparents in caring for very 
young children. Such support can have important direct and indirect influences 
on child development.  For example, a grandparent who babysits a young child 
while parents have a night out has a direct interaction with the child in the 
context of providing care.  However, there is also an indirect influence in the 
context of supporting the mother-father relationship which, in turn, could be 
expected to affect (positively) parental interactions with the child. 
 
The transition to parenthood and early infancy have been identified in the 
literature as the critical periods requiring most support. Infancy is a particularly 
intensive parenting period. Children at this stage remain highly dependent on 
caregivers for their basic needs but, by 9 months (the age of infants at the time of 
data collection in the GUI study), they are also starting to become more mobile 
and interaction-seeking.  In the Irish context, 9 months may also be the stage 
when mothers may be contemplating a return to work or education following 
maternity leave (paid and unpaid) – and those who have been breastfeeding will 
likely have finished at least exclusive breastfeeding. 
 
Here we report some key results from the paper; further detail, and a full set of 
references to the literature can be found in the paper itself. 
 
PERCEIVED AVAILABILITY OF SUPPORT 
The effectiveness of the social support system available to the parent may be 
best assessed by a subjective measurement of the parent’s satisfaction with the 
support they receive rather than through an objective assessment of the number 
or types of supports available. An important source of this support is from 
grandparents. Contact with grandparents seems to be relatively high in Ireland, 
perhaps because of the small size of the country and low levels of mobility, but 
 

amanda.quail@esri.ie; aisling.murray@esri.ie; james.williams@esri.ie 
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perhaps also because of the value placed on the extended family. The role of 
grandparents in children’s lives is an area which needs further research. They are 
likely to have an important role in the lives of infants, many of them providing 
informal childcare and babysitting while parents return to work.  
 
Growing Up in Ireland interviewed 11,100 primary caregivers (almost all of 
whom were biological mothers) when their infants were 9-months-old. In the 
context of the wider interview, mothers were asked a number of questions 
directly on the amount of support which they felt they were receiving and also on 
the level of contact they had with the infant’s grandparents. A majority (72 per 
cent) felt that they got enough help/support from family and friends and 6 per 
cent said they did not need any help.  However 10 per cent of mothers felt that 
they did not get enough help and 5 per cent said they got no help at all. An 
additional 8 per cent said that their family were not living in the country (and 
therefore were unavailable to provide support). 
 
Mothers in larger families were less likely to report that they get enough support 
than those with only one child. This was the case for both lone parents and 
mothers in two-parent families. In families with one child (both lone-parent and 
two-parent families) 87 per cent reported that they got enough support. This 
figure dropped to about 80 per cent for mothers with two or more children, with 
similar figures for both lone parents and two-parent families.  
 
TYPES OF SUPPORT PROVIDED BY GRANDPARENTS 
High levels of contact with grandparents were reported in the Growing Up in 
Ireland study, with almost 9 out of 10 of mothers reporting that they were in 
regular contact with the infant’s grandparents. In most other cases the 
grandparents were abroad, or deceased. A wide range of important supports 
were provided by grandparents to the families of Growing Up in Ireland infants. 
(Table 1) For example, one in three families often benefited from grandparents 
providing babysitting, while direct financial support was much less common 
(“never” being the most frequent response). 
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Table 1: Frequency and Types of Support Provided by Grandparents 
 
How often do infant's grandparents… Never Sometimes Often 
 % % % 
Babysit 19 48 33 
Have baby to stay over night 62 32 6 
Take baby out 46 30 24 
Buy toys or clothes for baby 4 81 15 
Help you around the house 56 26 18 
Help you out financially 71 26 3 
 
 
GRANDPARENT SUPPORT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR LONE 
PARENTS 
Support from grandparents was particularly important for families comprising a 
lone parent with one child. They had the highest reported usage for each support 
type  and differed significantly from every other family type in three of the five 
categories ( they did not differ significantly from other lone parents in terms of 
‘help around the house’ and ‘financial help’). For example, almost 2 out of 3  lone 
parents with one child reported that the infant’s grandparents had the infant to 
stay overnight. This compares with 47 per cent among lone parents with two or 
more children, 45 per cent for two-parent families with one child and 31% for 
two-parent families with two or more children. The largest differential between 
lone-parent families and two-parent families was for ‘financial help’. This varied 
between 50-56 per cent for lone-parents to approximately 25 per cent for two-
parent families. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The Growing Up in Ireland findings confirm that many families receive 
substantial amounts of support from grandparents, and this applies particularly 
to lone parents. While a majority of parents felt that were getting enough 
support from family and friends, there remains concerns for those who perceive 
they are receiving inadequate support – and for families who have a drop in 
support following the incapacity or death of a grandparent. Some of the supports 
provided by grandparents, such as babysitting or taking the infant out, are likely 
to be mutually enjoyable for the infant and grandparents. Direct financial support 
is less common for two-parent families, however it is also clear that many lone 
parents are receiving some financial support from their own parents. 
 
†
Williams, J., S. Greene, S. McNally, A. Murray and A. Quail (2010). Growing Up in 
Ireland – The National Longitudinal Study of Children: The Infants and their 
Families. Dublin: The Stationery Office. Available for download at 
http://www.esri.ie/UserFiles/publications/BKMNEXT179.pdf 
